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Summary
The evolution of cooperation can be seen as a paradox in the light of the theory of
natural selection. In simple terms this theory states how evolution is driven mainly
by competition. However, nature presents us with multiple examples across differ-
ent scales, from prokaryotes to humans, of organisms that co-operate and in turn are
cheated by other individuals. Co-existence between these two actors is well documented
in the literature and understanding the emergence and maintenance of this behaviour
is an important challenge for evolutionary biology.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse a co-operative system where the presence
of “cheats” maximises the fitness of the group in competition experiments between two
strains of yeast growing under sucrose limitation. The so-called “cooperators” secrete
the enzyme invertase hydrolysing sucrose and therefore making glucose available for
the rest of the population. Conversely, cells that do not secrete this enzyme but obtain
the benefit of the available glucose are referred to as “cheats”.
We use a system-biological model constructed from the underlying biochemistry to
explore the mechanisms that make the presence of non-producers maximise the fitness
of the population. Mechanism that can be summarised as follows: the existence of a
well-documented rate-efficiency trade-off, the fact that producing invertase is associated
with a metabolic cost, and a spatially-structured environment.
Finally, in this thesis we also examine how temporal structure can affect the pop-
ulation dynamics of the system. We achieve this by introducing a seasonal dynamics
where cells compete for the limiting resource during a fixed time interval, before being
transferred into a new plate with fresh growth medium. In the final part of this thesis
we show that both the length of each season and the transfer protocol under consid-
eration are important factors determining the co-existence patterns and the long-term
dynamics of the system.
2
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
“The great tragedy of Science:
the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact.”
T. H. Huxley
1.1 Evolution and co-operation
Natural selection is one of the most successful theories ever proposed. This theory, pos-
tulated by Darwin over 150 years ago, has been able to explain adaptation, survival and
reproduction of individuals based on competition and the survival of individuals with a
higher fitness. Fitness is defined as the genotype with the highest average reproductive
success in a particular environment during their lifetime. Therefore, co-operative be-
haviour, whereby an individual pays a fitness cost for someone else’s benefit [5], seems
like an immediate paradox. Understanding the conditions favouring and maintain-
ing co-operation in nature thus presents one of the greatest challenges of evolutionary
biology [78].
The problem of altruism sits in the context of the problem of the evolution of social
interactions, a process based on changes that are inherited across several generations
and, according to their fitness effects, can fix in the population, having consequences
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Table 1.1: Social interaction between actor and recipient
Fitness impact
For recipient +
Fitness impact
For recipient -
Fitness impact for actor + Mutual benefit Selfishness
Fitness impact for actor - Altruism Spite
for both the actor and the recipient. In a simple formulation, any given encounter can
present any of the following outcomes: if the actor co-operates the interaction is said to
be mutually beneficial when it benefits both the actor and the recipient, or altruistic
if it only benefits the recipient. In contrast, if the actor defects, the interaction can
be classified as selfish when the actor obtains benefit from the recipient or spiteful if
neither of them receives a benefit, as shown in Table 1.1 (reproduced from [103]).
Thus, by definition, an altruist produces a benefit to others while paying an indi-
vidual fitness cost for the benefit of the group. At first sight therefore natural selection
should act to increase the abundance of “cheats” (alias “defectors”), individuals that
do not pay a cost, but still obtain the benefit. Indeed, in the absence of a co-operation-
promoting mechanisms, defectors have a higher average fitness and thus are expected
both to invade a population of co-operators and fixate in the population [70], a feature
illustrated in Figure 1-1.
Figure 1-1: In the absence of mechanisms that promote the evolution of co-operation,
natural selection favours defectors [70]. Here C indicates a co-operator and D a
defector/cheat.
The first and most obvious prediction of this simple conception is that altruistic
co-operation should be rare in nature. Putatively co-operative behaviour has, however,
been found in humans [101], chimpanzees [20], meerkats [17], fish [13], bats [105], insects
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[11, 47, 88], and microbes [62, 42, 2, 103, 29], just to mention a few examples.
Altruistic acts may be understandable in humans, “the kings of co-operation” ac-
cording to [70], as they have the potential to observe the behaviour of others, remember
who has co-operated in the past and assemble reputations, thus enabling discrimination
as to whom to punish and whom to favour [74]. The precise conditions favouring co-
operation in such psychologically rich organisms as humans remains contentious. This
is not the subject of this thesis. Rather I shall examine a circumstance in which such
complexities are removed. I shall consider why microbes with a lack of “consciousness”
act altruistically “helping” others in detriment of their own benefit. This is arguably
one of the most challenging questions of microbial evolution. If we cannot fully under-
stand co-operation in such simple cases what hope have we of understanding it in more
complex instances?
1.2 Previous theoretical approaches to understand co-operation
Over the last decades, great efforts have been invested in order to develop a general
theory that explains the evolution of co-operation. The most important theory is known
as Kin selection or Inclusive fitness, announced by W. D. Hamilton in 1963 as:
“Despite the principle of ‘survival of the fittest’ the ultimate criterion that deter-
mines whether G will spread is not whether the behaviour is to the benefit of the behaver
but whether it is to the benefit of gene G”. [Hamilton, 1963, p 335]
By shifting the focus of attention from the costs and benefits encountered by a given
individual to the costs and benefits encountered by an allele, this theory provides an
explanation of broad applicability as to why co-operation can evolve between relatives,
using what is known as Hamilton’s rule. This notes that altruism is favoured when
rb− c > 0, where c represents the cost of the altruistic behaviour, r the level of genetic
relatedness (genetic similarity) and b the fitness benefit of the beneficiary [40].
These three parameters broadly define the conditions where altruism might be
5
Chapter 1. Introduction
expected: where the benefits are high compared with the costs and where relatedness
between altruist and receiver of the benefits is high. There are two principal mechanisms
to obtain high relatedness (r):
• Limited dispersal, whereby kin tend to stay together. In particular, spatial struc-
ture allows the benefit of a co-operator to be shared with neighbours, which are
most likely to be related.
• Kin discrimination: The altruist distinguishes between relatives and non-relatives
and somehow directs the benefits of co-operation disproportionately towards its
relatives.
A different approach, often used in economics and sociology, uses game theory as a
mathematical framework [66, 58]. In contrast to kin selection, (that subsumes natural
selection), this approach argues that natural selection is the main driving force for the
evolution of co-operation [72], kin selection is not necessary . Whether this is a merely
semantic argument [1] or not, it is not the aim of this thesis to discuss it.
Evolutionary game theory
In its simplest form, evolutionary game theory treats co-operation as an N -player game
where individuals have two possible strategies: defect or co-operate. The latter strategy
has a cost c for the co-operator and produces a benefit b for the population, while the
previous produces no benefit to the population and carries no cost to the player.
The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is based on a game where two prisoners are interro-
gated separately for a crime they have been accused of. In this game the actors has
two possibles strategies, to defect or to co-operate. Co-operation results in a benefit to
the opposing player (b) but came with an inherent cost for the actor (c). In this partic-
ular case if both actors co-operate the resulting payoff for the actor will be denoted by
R = b− c, in contrast if the actor defects and the opponent co-operates then the actor
gets a better payoff for the action T = b without paying the cost of co-operation. If the
6
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Table 1.2: Payoff matrix for a PD
Cooperate Defect
Payoff to Co-operate b− c −c
Payoff to Defect b 0
Table 1.3: Payoff matrix for a SDG
Cooperate Defect
Payoff to Co-operate b− c/2 b− c
Payoff to Defect b 0
actor decides to co-operate but the opponent defects then the payoff will be S = −c
and finally, if both actor and opponent defect the payoff for that action will be P = 0.
If we look closely to these payoffs we notice that the best strategy for both players (i.e.
the strategy with the lower payoff) is to defect.
If one changes the conditions of the prisoner’s dilemma making the one-way de-
fection sufficient for both players to obtain a benefit from the action, we have the
snowdrift game (SDG) defined by a payoff matrix shown in Table 1.3 and with the
particularity that, in contrast with the PD, a co-operative strategy has an advantage
(i.e. the strategy with the lower payoff).
As we have seen, different games are represented with different payoff matrices,
representing the fitness advantage of adopting different evolutionary strategies. For
example Table 1.4 illustrates two possible games that have been used to explain the
evolution of co-operation [21]: prisoners dilemma and snowdrift game.
Note that when playing the Prisoners Dilemma, the only stable equilibrium is
mutually cheating and therefore co-operation cannot be maintained. Conversely, in
Table 1.4: Optimal strategy when playing PD and SDG
Game Optimal Strategy Outcome
Prisoners
Dilemma
T ≥ R ≥ S ≥ P Cheat Cheats win
Snowdrift Game T ≥ S ≥ R ≥ P Depends on the
other player, op-
posite.
Persistence of co-
operation
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the Snowdrift game the stable equilibrium is mutual co-operation and therefore co-
operation can be maintained, a feature shown in Table 1.4, [21]. In the case of a
one-shot play of PD, fixation of co-operation is not possible but including extensions
and modifications of the same game like iterated interactions can lead us to find that
co-operation can be a stable equilibrium in the population [71].
The fixation of co-operators often depends upon population structure, which not
only depends on environmental factors but also on individual behaviour, it is important
to notice that this structure can be dynamic [96].
As with kin selection, game theory has been exceptionally successful in capturing
general trends of when co-operation is or is not maintained [21, 74, 19, 3], but as well
as kin selection, lacks of quantitative predictive power.
Another problem with the theories of co-operation discussed so far, is the use of
verbal arguments that resemble the human experience, for instance using words like
“altruism” or “cheating”. This descriptive language is used metaphorically as it implies
conscious decisions that are made to comply ethical rules. Indeed this language has
been useful allowing us intuitive understanding of a given biological process but, as
discussed in this thesis, can be overly simplistic, misleading and confusing.
1.3 A systems biology of co-operation
In many fields of evolutionary biology, much progress has been made possible through
the construction of a theoretical framework that enables strong quantitative predic-
tions (rather than describing broad qualitative trends). For example, Kimura’s neutral
theory made exact predictions both about the ratio of the variance in the number of
substitutions per lineage to the mean (the dispersion index) and the extent to which
heterozygosity should vary with population size. That the dispersion index is consis-
tently greater than the predicted unity [73], and that heterozygosity does not increase
as much as expected in large populations (although, importantly the qualitative trend
8
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is consistent) [32], have been two pivotal planks on which rejection of strict neutrality
was based [73]. Similarly, Kondrashov’s mutational deterministic theory [53] generated
much research interest, as it predicted not simply that obligate sexual species would
have a per genome deleterious mutation rate higher than that seen in obligate asexuals,
but also that obligate sexuals will have a per genome deleterious mutation rate greater
than one per genome per generation. This enabled attempts to falsify the model on
quantitative grounds (see eg. [48]). Although this theories are not mechanistic i.e.
bottom up models, they highlight the importance of been able to quantify predictions.
If quantitative predictive power is a limitation of both frameworks, kin selection and
game theory, can we consider a different approach to co-operation, one that is capable
of making quantitative predictions? In this thesis I will deploy tools from systems
and population biology to attempt this. My approach follows a bottom-up type of
modelling, posing theoretical abstractions but parameterised using known underlying
biochemical rate constants. The goal of this approach is to capture, with quantitative
accuracy, observed population-level outcomes and dynamics.
This framework is importantly different from others as, rather than defining fitness
apriori, it considers fitness to be a consequence not only of the underlying molecular and
biochemical details but also of the environmental, spatial and temporal dynamics. In
short, I model the underlying biology from which I derive fitness, rather than supposing
that I know fitness before the fact. An immediate consequence of this approach is that
I need to consider the specifics of a given system. The aim of this approach then is to
derive a detailed understanding of co-operation in a given system from which one can
ask whether lessons learnt may have any relevance to other system. This contrasts with
the classical approaches (kin selection/game theory approaches) in which toy models
(i.e. biologically non-specific) are analysed, with post hoc attempts to relate insights
to the behaviour observed in any given system. Indeed, the theoretical success of tit-
for-tat as a strategy in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, enabling reciprocal altruism,
spawned the search for organisms playing this strategy. However, reciprocal altruism,
despite receiving considerable theoretical interest, appears to be rare in nature with
9
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few convincing examples [41, 90]. Whether any organism plays tit-for-tat is unresolved
and the broader scale relevance of the abundant theoretical literature on the PD can
be questioned [41]
1.4 Microbial co-operation
For a systems biological approach to work, I need to be able to quantitatively model
and experiment with the co-operative system. The obvious choice is a microbial sys-
tem. Microbial model systems are an important tool in the field of evolutionary biology
[14], not only because of microbes having a “simple” genome (allowing genetic manip-
ulation), but also because their fast generation time allows us to observe evolution in
a human time-scale [27].
In the last decades, a wide-range of co-operative behaviours have been observed
in microbial systems. These include division of labour [2], cross-feeding between and
within species [63, 42] and the production of public goods [12, 36]. The evolution of
multicellularity [45, 37] one of the major evolutionary transitions [95] can be configured
as a problem of microbial co-operation. We can also find examples where co-operation
can be a mechanism for virulence of pathogens that are intrinsically connected with
human activities and well-being [52].
1.5 The invertase system in yeast
The system model that I will study in this thesis is one of the most popular examples of
a public goods game in microbes: the polymorphic secretion of invertase by yeast (Sac-
charomyces cerevisiae). Invertase is an enzyme that catalyses the hydrolysis of sucrose
into fructose and glucose. Although yeast can take up sucrose [6], monosacharides like
glucose and fructose are transported into the cell at a higher rate by the same family
of transporters (HXT ) but these transporters have a higher binding affinity for glucose
than for fructose., therefore glucose is the preferred carbon source of yeast (see Figure
10
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1-2). Genes coding for invertase belong to the SUC family; in particular SUC2 plays
an important role [67].
Figure 1-2: Metabolic structure of an Invertase Producer (SUC2).
Invertase enhances growth in yeast by making glucose available in the environment
when sucrose is a food substrate. The production of invertase, however, is associated
with a metabolic cost. Some strains of yeast do not secrete this enzyme but, in the
presence of producers, exploit the monosacharides available in the environment (see
Figure 1-3).
Figure 1-3: Schematic competition between invertase producers (SUC2 ) and non-
producers (suc2 ). Both strains can take up the 3 different carbon sources (glucose,
fructose and sucrose) , both glucose and fructose compete for the same transporter
(HXT ) although this transporter has a higher binding affinity for glucose, sucrose is
take up by the H+symport, with a lower rate of consumption.
Then why does yeast produce costly invertase and share the resulting glucose with
the population? What strategy maximises the fitness of the group? Using an engineered
11
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yeast strain that cannot secrete invertase and performing competition experiments in
structured environments, Greig and Travisano argue that the Prisoners Dilemma could
explain the observed negative frequency dependence [36].
Recently, Gore and van Oudenaarden [34] established that co-operation can be
maintained in the population even in well-mixed environments, they proposed that
competition between both strains could be explained using a Snowdrift game rather
than a Prisoners Dilemma. Other studies, for example [92] argue that contrasting
strategies are used in different circumstances, so in order to capture the complexity of
the interaction, different games are played at different moments in time.
In general, classical theories of co-operation assume that co-operators by definition
increase the average fitness of a group [70, 19]. For instance, when calculating the
maximal population payoff in a simple Snowdrift game we find that fitness is maximal
when all individuals co-operate, and therefore this strategy is the best for the group.
If x represents the frequency of co-operators in the population, then the population
payoff in a SDG is defined as:
x2R+ x(1− x)S + x(1− x)T + (1− x)2P.
Therefore population payoff is maximal when:
x =
(2P − S − T )
2(R− S − T + P ) .
Incorporating the cost and benefits values from Table 2, we find that populations fitness
is maximal when all individuals are co-operating (x = 1) (Figure 1-4).
Craig MacLean performed a set of competition experiments between invertase pro-
ducers and invertase non-producers, starting with different frequencies of each type.
This experiment was performed with agar plates with sucrose synthetic medium.
Figure 1-5 shows the outcome of the experiment: fitness of the population is not
maximised when everyone “co-operates” as the Snowdrift game predicted. Measuring
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Figure 1-4: In a Snowdrift game the population fitness is maximised when all indi-
vidual in the population are “co-operators” (Frequency=1).
fitness as the total final population (titre), the maximal fitness is achieved when (maybe
wrongly called) “cheats” (non-invertase secretors) and “co-operators” (invertase secre-
tors) are both present in the population [61].
Understanding this unexpected result is the starting point of this thesis. Prior
game theoretical models do not capture this result [34]. Can a systems biological model
derive this result even though the model is not constructed to enable this result?. Using
both theoretical and experimental approaches I will study this model system with the
purpose of dissecting the biological mechanisms driving the evolution of co-operation in
this particular system: from molecular and metabolic processes to complex ecological
interactions.
1.6 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2 we introduce the core mathematical model: a set of ordinary differential
equations that describe the competition experiments of producers and non-producers
of invertase in agar plates growing in sucrose synthetic media. Parameterisation of the
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Figure 1-5: Experimental results (data from Craig MacLean) from a 48 hours com-
petition experiment between invertase producers and non-producers growing in agar
plates and a sucrose medium. Fitness is measured as Titre. Fitness is maximised
when a mix of “co-operators” and “cheats” are present in the population.
model was performed using experimental data obtained by Duncan Greig and Craig
MacLean and is also discussed in this chapter. For the purpose of this chapter, spatial
structure is considered in a phenomenological way, considering that spatial structure
can be defined from who is their neighbour and how many resources can be seen by
each competitor.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to discussion of predictions and experimental validation of
the model described in Chapter 2 in the context of the theory of co-operation. Here
we provide mechanistic explanations as to why fitness is maximised when there is a
mixture of “co-operators” and “cheats” in the population. Craig MacLean and Duncan
Greig performed the experiments used in this chapter. The main results presented in
Chapters 2 and 3 are published in [61].
In Chapter 4 we study how spatial structure can influence coexistence in a com-
petition experiment. For this we propose a spatially explicit model based on partial
differential equations, and use it to show that spatial structure is a necessary condition
to obtain the same outcome as presented in the previous chapter.
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In Chapter 5 we discuss a different temporal structure. By introducing seasonality
we present some theoretical results that may be important to understand the gener-
alisability of experimental systems. In particular, we use two different experimental
setups, both standard transfer experimental techniques: one representing a migratory
regime and the other one a non-migratory regime. From an ecological perspective,
these two regimes represent two different forms of re-colonising a summer ground in
different seasons.
Although usually ignored when designing experimental protocols, both regimes can
have different outcomes in terms of coexistence regarding temporal dynamics. Inter-
estingly, the temporal dynamics introduced by the transfer protocol can result in the
system presenting a chaotic behaviour, for instance when using the transfer time as a
bifurcation parameter.
To test some of these hypotheses, this chapter also includes a set of preliminary
experiments comparing both transfer protocols. The experiments were carried out by
me in the Max Planck Institute under the supervision of Duncan Greig and although
the results are non conclusive, they seem rather promising and help us to motivate a
subsequent study. The ongoing and future work, as well as the general conclusions of
this thesis, will be discussed in Chapter 6.
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Modelling the polymorphic secretion of invertase by yeast
2.1 Saccharomyces cerevisiae
Yeast is an eukaryotic organism that is widespread in nature, with about 1500 different
species but only less than 1% of those species has been described. One of these species
is Saccharomyces cerevisiae, also called “budding” yeast for its ability to reproduce
by mitosis in contrast with others species that reproduce by fission and are so-called
fission yeast . Another important feature of S. cerevisiae is its ability to switch between
respiration and fermentation, producing ethanol as a by-product of fermentation using
the glycolytic pathway [87, 106]. Humans have taken advantage of this feature and
used S. cerevisiae to brew alcoholic drinks like beer and wine and to rise bread, and for
this reason it has been argued that it was the first organism domesticated by humans
[35]. Moreover, in the last 30 years yeast has become one of the most important model
organisms to study genetics [24, 109], and the last decade has seen the complete genome
of yeast published (available in http://www.yeastgenome.org/), making it one of the
best characterised eukaryotic organisms.
Glucose is one of the preferred carbon sources of yeast [31]. Furthermore, glucose
is an important messenger molecule, regulating important metabolic traits, such as
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growth rate, fermentation capacity and response to stress. Glucose molecules also reg-
ulate proteins that are involved in the uptake of other carbon sources such as maltose,
galactose and sucrose [87]. This is an important feature that will be further discussed
in this chapter.
Yeast cells regulate the transcription of many proteins by sensing the environmen-
tal concentration of carbon sources (e.g. glucose) using sensor proteins located in the
membrane. To date, the sensing mechanisms are not fully understood, although some
glucose-sensing proteins have been identified: Snf3, Rgt2, Gpr1 and Hxk2 [76]. These
sensors induce the transcription of the hexoses transporters (HXT genes) that are lo-
cated also on the membrane, being HXT1 and HXT3 low affinity transporters (induced
at high concentration of glucose) and HXT6 and HXT7 high affinity transporters (re-
pressed at high level of glucose) [59, 108].
One of the proteins regulated by glucose, and the one studied in this thesis, is
invertase. This enzyme catalyse the hydrolysis of sucrose and breaks this molecule into
two monosocharides, glucose and fructose, that are then transported into the cell.
Wild type S. cerevisiae secretes the enzyme invertase in order to catalyse the hy-
drolysis of sucrose. The SUC genes, that code for invertase in S. cerevisiae, are highly
polymorphic [67]. This polymorphism is expressed in number of copies and function-
ality of the genes; in [67] from 91 laboratory strains, about 80% of the strains carry a
single active gene (SUC2 ) and 8% of strains carry at least 2 SUC genes. There exist,
nevertheless, a minority of strains (about 12%) that don’t secrete invertase, carrying a
degenerate suc pseudogene. We will focus our attention in the SUC2 gene, and impor-
tant feature of the expression of this gene is that its regulated by the concentration of
glucose in the environment [68].
It is important to notice that glucose is not the only carbon source that can be used
by the cell. For instance, sucrose can be also transported into the cell trough an ac-
tive sucrose-H+ symport, mediated by two different transport systems: a high-affinity
uptake pathway mediated by AGT1 permease and a low-affinity pathway mediated by
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MALx1 maltose transporters [94]. It is known, however, that these transporters are
less efficient than the glucose transporters mentioned before [8].
2.2 Modelling growth kinetics
In order to model how yeast cells grow in an environment with a concentration of a
limiting resource denoted with the variable R, we will assume that cells can take up
resources and convert them into ATP using a simple unbranched metabolic pathway
[81]. The rate of ATP production in the pathway will be denoted hereafter by JATP
and can be described by the expression:
JATP = nRATP · JR,
where JR denotes the rate of substrate consumption of the pathway. This is a function
of the resource concentration, R, and will be represented mathematically as JR(R).
The term nRATP denotes the number of ATP molecules produced in the pathway and is
a decreasing function of JR. Yield of ATP production is known to depend on the rate
of resource uptake [82], termed rate-yield trade-off.
When modelling microbial growth rate we used a linear function of the rate of ATP
production, namely r · JATP , where r is some proportionality constant [82]. For the
purpose of this thesis we will assume, except where stated otherwise, that r = 1. In
practice, yield of ATP production nRATP is not as easy to measure as the efficiency, n
R
e ,
whereby
nRe = n
R
ATP · b,
where b is a constant denoting the amount of biomass formed per unit of ATP.
Therefore we consider a rate-efficiency trade-off instead of rate-yield trade-off. Ex-
perimental evidence of this trade-off been has been found for plenty of heterotrophic
organisms [69, 9, 82, 30]. Based on [104] the shape of the trade-off function (nHxte ) used
in this thesis is shown in Figure 2-1.
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Figure 2-1: Rate-efficiency trade-off, shape of the function taken form [104].
2.3 Sugar uptake
In Section 2.1 we discussed in general how glucose regulates transcription of different
proteins. For modelling purposes we will take into account that yeast cells only have
sensors for glucose (Snf3 and Rgt2) , so glucose alone is responsible for the activation
of SUC2, the gene that codes for invertase.
Hexoses (fructose and glucose) enter the cell and are metabolised through the gly-
colytic pathway together, although it is important to notice the transporters have
higher affinity for glucose than for fructose [77, 84]. Sucrose enters the cell through the
MAL transporter and for simplicity we will assume that it is metabolised through its
own pathway, as illustrated in Figure 2-2.
19
Chapter 2. Modelling the polymorphic secretion of invertase by yeast
Figure 2-2: Simplification of the pathway: Snf3 and Rgt2 are glucose sensor proteins
that activate the transcription of HXT, this family of transporters allows hexoses to
enter the cell activating SUC2 producing invertase, MAL is a maltose transporter
that allows sucrose to enter into the cell.
2.3.1 Hexose uptake
Glucose and fructose are transported into the cell through hexose transporters (HXT )
and we will assume that there is one non-specific site for both hexoses to bind. Let
us denote with the variables V Gmax and V
F
max the maximal uptake rate of the pathway
for glucose and fructose respectively and KGm and K
F
m the half-saturations constants.
As we are assuming both sugars compete for one non-specific site, we can model their
uptake using a competition for one-site Michaelis-Menten dynamics:
JG =
V Gmax ·G
KGm · (1 + FKGc ) +G
(2.1)
JF =
V Fmax · F
KFm · (1 + GKFc ) + F
(2.2)
whereby KGc and K
F
c denote the competition constants for glucose and fructose.
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The efficiency of the hexose pathway is represented by nHxte (J
G + JF ) and, as
discussed in section 2.2, is a function of the concentration of both sugars and exhibits
a rate-efficiency trade-off. In simple terms, the rate-efficiency trade-off makes yeast
convert hexoses into ATP inefficiently when exposed to abundant resources, compared
to the situation when cells are exposed to lower resource levels and therefore are used
more efficiently.
2.3.2 Sucrose uptake
Although yeast does not have a specific site for transporting sucrose, this molecule can
still be transported inefficiently into the cell. In this thesis, we modelled the uptake and
efficiency of this sugar completely separate from the pathway for hexoses, as illustrated
in Figure 2-2. While yeast SUC knockout strains do not use internal invertase to
hydrolyses sucrose, they can nonetheless metabolise it efficiently using maltase [50].
This has been the normal mode of sucrose utilisation lacking invertase [94]. There are
plenty of evidence to hypothesis that this is the case, suc2 strains without maltase
cannot grow on sucrose [50], while suc2 strains missing the hexose import channels
grow well [7].
The parameters used to model the uptake of sucrose were obtained using the kinetics
of active H+-sucrose symport activity acquired from [6] (see Figure 2-3) the authors
measured the kinetics in 1403-7A strain, JS(S) will be measure in mmolg protein · hour and
S in mmol. Using a piece-wise linear fit on the experimental data we estimated the
following function:
JS(S) =

64 · S, 0 ≤ S ≤ 0.042
14.8 · S + 2.1, 0.042 < S ≤ 0.043
2.04 · S + 7.57, 0.043 < S ≤ 0.9
1.48 · S + 8.08, 0.9 < S

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Figure 2-3: Kinetics of active H+-sucrose symport as a function of the concentration
of sucrose. Data points (in red) from [6].
2.4 Invertase production
Wild-type S. cerevisiae secretes the enzyme invertase in order to catalise the hydrolysis
of sucrose. SUC2 is the gene responsible for invertase secretion and its expression is
regulated by the concentration of glucose in the environment [10].
Secreted invertase hydrolyses sucrose (S), into glucose (G) and fructose (F ), and
we will model the rate of conversion (Inv) with a function that can be written as:
Inv = inv(JG) · S
(k + S)
.
where inv is the invertase activity, a term known to be glucose uptake dependent [8],
here we will also assume that the rate of sucrose degradation is a saturating function
of sucrose concentration therefore k denotes a saturating constant and takes the value
k = 10−4.
Interestingly, invertase production is associated with a metabolic cost [34, 36]. Here
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the cost function cInv varies with the glucose levels as yeast only has specific sensors
for glucose. Then the cost function can be modelled as follows:
cInv = inv(JG) · U Inv,
where U Inv denotes the unit cost of producing each molecule of invertase.
In [26] the authors estimated the relationship between invertase activity and glucose
consumption rate using KOY.PK2-1C83 wild type strain and its various genetically
manipulated derivatives. Using their data we estimated invertase activity, denoted by
inv(JG), as (data and estimated invertase activity is shown in Figure 2-4):
inv(JS) = −2.3453 · (JG)2 + 32.609 · (JG) + 77.109.
Note that invertase production is conditioned not on sucrose, but on local glucose levels,
high glucose suppress the production on invertase, and absence of glucose resulting in a
residual low level production, the maximum of this production is the result of medium
levels of glucose concentration.
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Figure 2-4: Invertase activity ( mmolgrams·hour ) as a function of glucose consumption,
data points (in red) from [26] and estimated invertase activity (in black).
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2.5 Modelling homogeneous environment
Considering the previous sections, we can put together a model of the growth dynamics
of two different types of cells: invertase producers (Np) and invertase non-producers
(Nn), growing in a homogeneous environment (for example a flask that is continuously
shaken) with the limiting resources sucrose (S ), glucose (G) and fructose (F ) with a
set of differential equations that can be written as:
dS
dt
= −JS · (Np +Nn)− Inv ·Np,
dG
dt
= −JG · (Np +Nn) + Inv ·Np,
dF
dt
= −JF · (Np +Nn) + Inv ·Np,
dNp
dt
= (1− cInv) · (nHxte (JG + JF ) · (JG + JF ) + nSe · JS) ·Np,
dNn
dt
= (nHxte (J
G + JF ) · (JG + JF ) + nSe · JS) ·Nn,
suitably augmented with initial conditions.
This set of ordinary differential equations describe a competition experiment be-
tween two competitors growing in a sucrose environment. At the beginning of the
experiment sucrose is the only carbon source in the environment but as time increases,
the production of invertase makes fructose and glucose available. Note that the only
difference between producers and non-producers in the set of equations is that Np pays
a fitness cost represented by the term (1− cInv).
2.6 A phenomenological approach to modelling space
In addition to the homogeneous environment described in the previous section, we are
also interested in modelling structured environments such as agar plates. In order to
accomplish this we will use a phenomenological approach to model spatial structure,
given by a mixing parameter denoted by the variable m, whereby 0 ≤ m ≤ 1.
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This parameter represents the proportion of cells of a given type that have a different
type as a neighbour, in such a way that when m = 0 the two strains are spatially
segregated, while when m = 1 the two strains are considered to be well-mixed. For 0 <
m < 1 the environment can be viewed as if consisting of three different regions: region
1 where Np are surrounded only by their own type, region 2 where Nn is surrounded
only by their own type and region 3 where Np and Nn are neighbours. The proportion
of Np in region 3 is equal to m, which is equal to the proportion of Nn also in region
3. The three cases described above are illustrated in Figure 2-5.
Note that while both strains of yeast are non-motile, resources can move throughout
the environment at a rate represented by D (Note that D does not refer to classical
diffusion). Therefore the spatial structure of the population does not correspond with
the spatial distribution of the resources.
Figure 2-5: Spatial Structure. In panel A when m = 0 the two strains are spatially
segregated in the two red regions. In panel B when m = 1 the two strains coexist
together in the red region. In panel C when 0 < m < 1 the three regions are occupied,
in all the three cases resources diffuse from one region to another.
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The following set of equations represent a competition experiment between two
different types of cells (invertase producers and invertase non-producers) in a hetero-
geneous environment growing under sucrose limitation:
dS1
dt
= −JS1 ·N1p − Inv ·N1p + D2 (
1
2
· S2 + 12 · S3 − S1), (2.3a)
dG1
dt
= −JG1 ·N1p + Inv ·N1p +D · (12 ·G2 +
1
2
·G3 −G1), (2.3b)
dF1
dt
= −JF1 ·N1p + Inv ·N1p +D · (12 · F2 +
1
2
· F3 − F1), (2.3c)
dN1p
dt
= (1− cInv) · (nHxte (JG1 + JF1) · (JG1 + JF1) + nS1e · JS1) ·N1p, (2.3d)
dS2
dt
= −JS2 ·N2n + D2 · (
1
2
· S1 + 12 · S3 − S2), (2.3e)
dG2
dt
= −JG2 ·N2n +D · (12 ·G1 +
1
2
·G3 −G2), (2.3f)
dF2
dt
= −JF2 ·N2n +D · (12 · F1 +
1
2
· F3 − F2), (2.3g)
dN2n
dt
= (nHxte (J
G2 + JF2) · (JG2 + JF2) + nS2e · JS3) ·N2n, (2.3h)
dS3
dt
= −JS3 · (N3p +N3n)− Inv ·N3p + D2 · (
1
2
· S1 + 12 · S2 − S3), (2.3i)
dG3
dt
= −JG3 · (N3p +N3n) + Inv ·N3p +D · (12 ·G1 +
1
2
·G2 −G3), (2.3j)
dF3
dt
= −JF3 · (N3p +N3n) + Inv ·N3p +D · (12 · F1 +
1
2
F2 − F3), (2.3k)
dN3p
dt
= (1− cInv) · (nHxte (JG3 + JF3) · (JG3 + JF3) + nS2e · JS1) ·N3p, (2.3l)
dN3n
dt
= (nHxte (J
G3 + JF3) · (JG3 + JF3) + nS3e · JS3) ·N3n. (2.3m)
In this set of equations each region of the space is represented by superscripts 1, 2
and 3. Region 1 contains only cells of type N1p, while Region 2 is inoculated with cells
of type N2n and in Region 3, both types N3p and N3n, are present. Sucrose, fructose
and glucose are available for all three regions and move between them at a constant
rate D in the case of glucose and fructose, and as the sucrose molecule is twice the size
as the previous, then we consider its rate of movement between regions to be D/2.
The initial conditions for the set of equations (2.3) will depend on the mixing
parameter (m), the initial fraction of producers (f), the total population size (Nin)
and the initial input of sucrose in the environment (Sin). Then the initial conditions
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Table 2.1: Initial conditions for phenomenological model for the 3 regions.
Sucrose Glucose Fructose Np Nn
Region 1 (1−m) · f ·Sin 0 0 (1−m) ·f ·Nin 0
Region 2 (1−m)·(1−f)·
Sin
0 0 0 (1−m)·(1−f)·
Nin
Region 3 m · Sin 0 0 m · f ·Nin m · (1−f) ·Nin
for each region are the following:
We will now explore in more detail what happens at the extremes m = 0 and
m = 1. When m = 1, the two strains are perfectly mixed so that both producers and
non-producers reside solely within the region 3 while regions 1 and 2 do not contain
any yeast cells. On the other hand if m = 0 the two strains are spatially segregated so
that producers can only be found in region 1 while non-producers reside only in region
2 with region 3 remaining empty of yeast cells.
While we assume that yeast are immotile and do not move between the three
regions, resources are allowed to move through space. The constant D, reflects the
rate at which resources available to one strain become available to the other by moving
through regions 1, 2 and 3. This assumption has the following consequence. When
m = 0 even though region 3 does not contain yeast cells, resources are allowed to
diffuse into this region becoming unavailable for the consumption as long as they remain
there. Similarly, when m = 1 even though regions 1 and 2 do not contain yeast cells
resources move in and out of these regions becoming unavailable to both producers and
non-producers that solely reside in region 3.
The above leads to the following two artefacts:
• In the case of m = 1, even though the environment is perfectly mixed, a sub-
stantial chunk of resources are unavailable for consumption, implicitly imposing
a spatial structure.
• In the case of both m = 1 and m = 0, keeping resources away from both producers
and non-producers reduces the effect of the rate-yield trade-off and extends the
time it takes for all resources to be exhausted.
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For these reasons the phenomenological model (2.3) is defined for 0 < m < 1 while the
extreme cases m = 1 and m = 0 are treated separately.
2.7 Parameter estimation
In order to parameterise the model defined by equations 2.3 we used, when available,
estimates from literature.
The following parameters are used in all the simulations and experimental protocols.
1mg protein = 33× 106 cells
Sucrose 1.46 mmolg for 25 mL agar plate
Sucrose 1.17 mmolg for 20 mL agar plate
In the case where the corresponding parameters were not available for S. cerevisiae
we used metabolic estimates of different strains than the one studied in this thesis. The
values and references of such parameters are the following:
• From [75] we obtained growth parameters for glucose, in this study the measure-
ment was done for a strain derived from CEN.PK2-1C (MATa leu2-3,112 ura3-52
trp1-289 his3-∆ MAL 2-8c SUC2 hxt 14∆) grown in minimal media with 2% glcu-
ose at 30◦.
V Gmax = 40
mmol
g protein · hour .
KGm =
 1.9
mmol
25 mL agar plates
1.52 mmol20 mL agar plates

• For fructose KFm was obtained from [84], in this study the strain used was a wild
type from MC996A (MATa ura 3-52 his 3-11,15 leu 2-3 112 MAL2 SUC2 GAL
MEL)
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KFm =
 3.125
mmol
25 mL agar plates
2.5 mmol20 mL agar plates

• The uptake for sucrose was obtained from [6] in this study a 1403-7A strain is
used, this strain is a MAL constitutive strain that lacks invertase activity, grown
in rich YP media containing 20g/L sucrose.
JS(S) =

64 · S, 0 ≤ S ≤ 0.042
14.8 · S + 2.1, 0.042 < S ≤ 0.043
2.04 · S + 7.57, 0.043 < S ≤ 0.9
1.48 · S + 8.08, 0.9 < S

• Using data from [25] we estimated the invertase activity inv(JG) as
inv(JS) = −2.3453 · (JG)2 + 32.609 · (JG) + 77.109
in this study the strains used are isongenic strains derived from CEN.PK2-1
(MATa leu2-3 122 ura3-52 trp1-289 his3-∆ MAL2-8c SUC2 hxt12∆).
2.8 Growth experiments
Unfortunately we could not find all parameter values in the literature and therefore we
estimated the remaining using our own growth experiments. In our experiments yeast
cells were placed in two 5 µl patches 5 cm apart on 25 mL agar plates (for detailed
experimental methods see Appendix A).
Results from these experiments are summarised in Table 2.2. Each experiment is
based on six replicates with two different initial concentration of resources, and the
obtained data were used to fit the growth curves as explained in the remaining of this
chapter.
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Table 2.2: Growth experiments
Cell type Carbon
source
Initial cell
biomass g
protein/per
patch
(replica
average
n=6)
Length of
experiment
( days)
Final cell
biomass g
protein/per
patch
(replicate
average
n=6)
Experiment
1a
np sucrose
0.2%
9.737 · 10−6 4 0.00215
Experiment
1b
np sucrose 2% 9.737 · 10−6 4 0.0083
Experiment
2a
np glucose
0.2%
9.17 · 10−6 2 0.0029
Experiment
2b
np glucose 2% 9.17 · 10−6 2 0.0047
Experiment
3a
np fructose
0.2%
9.17 · 10−6 2 0.0025
Experiment
3b
np fructose 2% 9.17 · 10−6 2 0.0053
Experiment
4a
p fructose
0.2%
9.4 · 10−6 2 0.0023
Experiment
4b
p fructose 2% 9.4 · 10−6 2 0.005
Experiment
5a
np glucose
0.2% &
fructose
0.2%
9.17 · 10−6 2 0.0032
Experiment
5b
np glucose 2%
& fructose
2%
9.17 · 10−6 2 0.0043
Experiment
6a
p sucrose
0.2%
7.663 · 10−6 4 0.0071
Experiment
6b
p sucrose 2% 7.663 · 10−6 4 0.011
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2.8.1 Rate-efficiency trade-off of hexoses transport
In order to estimate the value for the rate efficiency trade-off we modelled growth of
non-producers (Nn) on glucose. This can be represented by a simple model:
dG
dt
= −JG ·Nn, (2.4)
dNn
dt
= nHxte · JG ·Nn. (2.5)
In the absence of fructose, F = 0, we obtain JG = V
G
max·G
KGm+G
. Furthermore, as mentioned
in 2.7, the values of V Gmax and K
G
m were fixed (obtained from the literature). The value
of nHxt as a function of the uptake of hexose ( for this particular case glucose) can be
estimated from the Experiments 2a and 2b from Table 2.2, the shape of the efficiency
function was taken from [104] and is shown in Figure 2-1. Note that the values obtained
from [104] were not used as these have been obtained in the chemostat. As pointed
out in [98], biomass yields estimates are found to be lower in chemostats than when
obtained from agar plates.
Fitting the model (2.4) to the experiments we have the following values (values are
measure in gproteinmmol·sucrose):
• a2 = 0.048
• b2 = 0.00632
• c2 = 0.001
The parameters x1, x2 and x3 denote the maximal uptake rate at 0.2%, 2% and 4% of
glucose (values are measure in mmolgprotein·h). In this case:
• x1 = 2.4
• x2 = 12
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• x3 = 16
2.8.2 Estimating maximal uptake-rate of fructose
Growth of non-producers in Fructose can be represented as:
dF
dt
= −JF ·Nn (2.6)
dNn
dt
= nHxte (J
F ) · JF ·Nn, (2.7)
In the absence of glucose G = 0, JF = V
F
max·F
KFm+F
, therefore the only parameter that
is not fixed is V Fmax. From the experimental results presented in Table 2.2 we have
two values for the cell density of the final population (Experimental data 3a, 3b) that
correspond to growth in 2% and 0.2% of fructose. Solving the equation we obtained
V Fmax = 54.93
mmol
g protein · hour .
2.8.3 Estimating the rate-efficiency trade-off of H+ − symport
Finally, the growth of non-producers on sucrose can be represented by:
dS
dt
= −JS ·Nn (2.8)
dNn
dt
= nSe · JS ·Nn. (2.9)
Having obtained from the literature the value for JS and using the value from Table
2.2 (Experiment 1a,1b) we have
nSe (J
S) =
 0.0295
g protein
mmolsucrose , 0 ≤ JS ≤ maximal uptake rate at 0.2%sucrose
0.0094 g proteinmmolsucrose , J
S > maximal uptake rate at 0.2%sucrose.

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2.8.4 Estimating the cost of invertase production
For estimating the cost of invertase production we competed producer and non-producer
strains in glucose-limited chemostats under conditions that induce secretion of invertase
without any possible benefit. For details of this experiment see AppendixA (Experi-
mental Methods A).
Using [22] as a motivation and using the results from the experiment just described,
we estimated:
U Inv = 0.00054e0.000001·inv(J
G).
U Inv is the cost for every unit of invertase produced, and hence the total cost will be
expressed as follows:
cInv = inv(JG) · U Inv.
5 10 15
5.38
5.4
5.42
5.44
5.46
5.48
5.5
5.52
x 10−4
Uptake
Co
st
Figure 2-6: Cost of invertase production (this is a dimensionless parameter) as a
function of uptake rate of glucose ( mmolgrprotein·hour ) .
Notice that inv(JG) is the production of invertase that was previously fitted, this
is just dependent on glucose uptake. Figure 2-6 illustrates the cost of invertase as a
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function of glucose uptake.
2.8.5 Estimating the hexose transporter competition functions for
glucose (KGc ) and fructose (K
F
c )
To estimate the competition parameters between fructose and glucose for the same
non-specific site (the HXT transporter), notice that growth of non-producers in these
two sugars can be expressed as:
dG
dt
= −JG ·Nn, (2.10)
dF
dt
= −JF ·Nn, (2.11)
dNn
dt
= nHxte (J
G + JF ) · (JG + JF ) ·Nn, (2.12)
where JG and JF are defined as
JG =
V Gmax ·G
KGm · (1 + FKGc ) +G
,
JF =
V Fmax · F
KFm · (1 + GKFc ) + F
.
The growth of producers on sucrose can also be represented by:
dS
dt
= −JS ·Np − Inv ·Np, (2.13)
dG
dt
= −JG ·Np + Inv ·Np, (2.14)
dF
dt
= −JF ·Np + Inv ·Np, (2.15)
dNp
dt
= (1− cInv) · (nHxte (JG + JF ) · (JG + JF ) + nSe · JS) ·Np. (2.16)
Using experiments 5 and 6 and fixing the remaining parameters, we obtained val-
ues of KGm and K
F
m (measure in
mmol
agar ) and therefore the expressions representing the
competition functions are the following:
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For 20 mL plates:
KGc =

0.53, 0 ≤ JG ≤ yG1
0.024, yG1 ≤ JG ≤ yG2
0.10, JG > y2

and
KFc =

0.04, 0 ≤ JF ≤ yF1
0.00704, yF1 ≤ JF ≤ yF2
0.01392, JF > yF2
 .
For 25 mL plates:
KGc =

0.67, 0 ≤ JG ≤ yG1
0.03 yG1 ≤ JG ≤ yG2
0.132, JG > y2

and
KFc =

0.05, 0 ≤ JF ≤ yF1
0.0088, yF1 ≤ JF ≤ yF2
0.0174, JF > yF2
 .
In the last expressions the constants yG1 ,y
F
1 denote the degradation of glucose and
fructose of 0.2% of sucrose while yG2 ,y
F
2 denote de concentrations of glucose and fructose
created from the degradation of 2% of sucrose. Fitting the set of equations (2.10)
and (2.13) to the data from experiments 6a and 6b we estimate the first part of the
equation corresponding to 0 ≤ JG(F ) ≤ yG(F )1 . For the next part corresponding to
y
G(F )
1 ≤ JG(F ) ≤ yG(F )2 we fitted the model (2.13) to the experimental data from
experiment 6b. Finally fitting the model (2.10) to the experimental data in 5b we find
the last part corresponding to JG(F ) > yG(F )2 .
For each component of the fit we have two free parameters and one experimental
data point. We then use the criteria that glucose is used preferentially over fructose and
35
Chapter 2. Modelling the polymorphic secretion of invertase by yeast
the sum of the maximal glucose uptake rate should be such that there is a rate-efficiency
trade-off as observed in Figure 2-1.
2.8.6 Estimating resource movement parameter D
The last free parameter of the system of equations defined in 2.3 is D. In order to
estimate the value of this parameter we used data from experiments where yeast cells
of each types (producers and non-producers) were distributed in two 5 µL patches of
liquid culture (grown overnight in YEPD broth) and placed in 25 mL agar plates (in
sucrose growth media) 5 cm apart form each other.
In agreement with the experimental design, of which the results are summarised in
Table 2.3, let us assume the two types of cells are placed in two different regions and,
as yeast is a non-motile organism, they are unable to move between regions. Resources,
however, are shared between regions and move between them at a rate D. Now, given
that the molecule of sucrose is twice the size of glucose and fructose, we assume that
this molecule moves between regions at a rate D/2, in contrast to glucose and fructose
that moves at a rate D. Then if Region 1 contains N1p and region 2 contains N2n, we
obtain the following system of ordinary differential equations suitably augmented with
initial conditions:
dS1
dt
= −JS1 ·N1p − Inv ·N1p + D2 · (S2 − S1),
dG1
dt
= −JG1 ·N1p + Inv ·N1p +D · (G2 −G1),
dF1
dt
= −JF1 ·N1p + Inv ·N1p +D · (F2 − F1),
dN1p
dt
= (1− cInv) · (nHxte (JG1 + JF1) · (JG1 + JF1) + nS1e · JS1) ·N1p,
dS2
dt
= −JS2 ·N2n + D2 · (S1 − S2),
dG2
dt
= −JG2 ·N2n +D · (G1 −G2),
dF2
dt
= −JF2 ·N2n +D · (F1 − F2),
dN2n
dt
= (nHxte (J
G2 + JF2) · (JG2 + JF 2) + nS2e · JS2) ·N2n.
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Based on the fact that parameters are already estimated using experimental data
summarised in Table 2.3, we then estimate D = 0.007.
Using the system of equations 2.3 with the parametrisation presented in this chap-
ter, in the following chapter we will present the results obtained after simulating nu-
merically competition experiments between populations composed of different fractions
of producers and non-producers growing under resource limitation.
Table 2.3: Experiment 8: Experimental data for estimating resources movement
rate D.
Carbon
source
Initial cell
biomass
producers
g pro-
tein/patch
1
Initial cell
biomass
of non-
producers
g pro-
tein/patch
2
Length of
experiment
(days)
Final cell
biomass of
producers
g protein/
patch 1
(n=6)
Final cell
biomass
of non-
producers
g pro-
tein/patch
2 (n=6)
0.2% su-
crose
1.28x10−5 9.710−6 4 0.0063 0.0035
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”Cheats” stimulate population growth in a public goods game.
Evolution is one of the most successful theories ever posed in biology, this theory
takes into account the competition between species. Despite the fierce competition,
cooperative behaviour exists and several examples can be found in nature. If co-
operation is defined as an act performed by an individual that enhances fitness of the
other reducing their own fitness, then in the natural selection context cooperation is an
apparent paradox. Altruistic co-operators, where individuals act in benefit of others
reducing their own fitness, are widespread in nature. This highlights the question of
how cooperators can survive, evolve and spread when they are not the fittest?
Co-operative behaviour is not exclusive for higher organisms, for instance several
examples have been reported in microbes [58, 18, 102, 15, 14]. Invertase secretion by
yeast is one of the classical examples of cooperation (public goods) in microorganisms
[36, 33, 92]. A public good is a product that was costly to produce for one of the actors
before being shared between all the population enhancing the overall fitness. The
production of invertase can be seen as a cooperative trait because it enhances growth
of cells by making glucose (yeast preferred carbon source) available to the group, and
thus increases their fitness. As discussed in the previous chapter, the production of
this enzyme is associated with a fitness cost.
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In this chapter we will use the mathematical model developed in Chapter 2 in
order to study the polymorphic invertase secretion in yeast, addressing one question in
particular: is it best for the group that all individuals co-operate? Classical cooperation
theory often considers that the best for a group is when every individual co-operates,
because by definition fitness is increased by co-operators. The competition between
producers and non-producers of invertase has been modelled as a snowdrift game [33],
in this framework, cooperation is the strategy that maximised the fitness of a group.
Despite this theoretical result, we found at least one experimental case where this
assumption does not hold.
Measuring population fitness as titre of cells after 48 hours (when all sucrose has
been exhausted), Figure 3-1 illustrates that fitness peaks when both producers and non-
producers are present. This result suggests a new reason why a diversity of strategies is
seen in social interactions. In such situations, in both nature and in humans, it is quite
common [36, 18, 46] to observe the co-existence of apparent cheats and co-operators.
This is also the case for invertase production: most strains of yeast secrete invertase, but
approximately 10% of strains do not [67]. Our results suggest that competition between
groups (the net productivity effect that we observe) as well as within groups, mediated
as negative frequency dependent selection (Figure 3-3), can both select for a diversity of
strategies. The independence of the within- and between-group effects needs emphasis.
In a snowdrift game formulation of the yeast system, for example, co-operators and
cheats can be stably maintained even in approximately homogeneous environments
[33]. In part this is because invertase is retained in the vicinity of SUC2 strains,
ensuring that producer strains receive a disproportionate amount of free glucose. This,
however, is independent of any effect on population fitness, as the games predicting
polymorphism also predict maximal population fitness when cheats are absent [33].
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Figure 3-1: Final population size(Log(titre,normalised to maximum observed titre))
after exhaustion of resources as a function of initial invertase producer frequency, in
theory (lines) and practice (points(*);mean ± s.e.m.; n=9).
3.1 ”Cheats” can enable maximal group benefit.
The model described in Chapter 2 captures the population fitness maximisation when
non-producers are present (Figure 3-1). Note too that the model was not constructed
in a manner designed to recover this result but rather to reflect known details of the
biology and biochemistry of yeast. That such an ”end-blind” model can capture un-
expected experimental results suggests it to be fit for purpose. For this simulation the
two extreme points (0% producers and 100% producers) use a one region model.
This result is also, at least in theory, independent of the definition of population
fitness. The population fitness we defined above as the total cell productivity after all
sucrose is exhausted. This is equivalent to population fitness for K selected organisms.
Were r selection more relevant, one might prefer to consider population growth rate
(per unit time) instead. Using this definition of population fitness does not, at least in
theory, importantly affect our conclusion that population fitness is maximal when pro-
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Figure 3-2: Using population growth as a measure of fitness. We observed that the
peak is in an intermediate fraction of producers and non-producers.
ducers and non-producers co-exist (Figure 3-2). Using population growth rate instead
of titre as measure of fitness as defined by [44]:
growth rate =
(Nend −Nstart)/2
tmid
where Nstart denotes the initial population size and Nend denotes the population size
just after the resources have been exhausted. The value tmid is the time at which the
population size reaches Nend−Nstart2 .
The expected population growth rate as a function of initial producer frequency is
shown in Figure 3-2 and confirms, in theory, that population fitness is maximal when
producers and non-producers co-exist regardless again from the mixing conditions.
We can further establish whether the model is fit for purpose by examining addi-
tional predictions. Our model, for example, predicts negative frequency dependence
of relative fitness (Figure 3-3). Although in contrast to Hamilton’s theoretical result
[40] that inclusive fitness of co-operators is not a function of co-operator frequency,
this result is not without precedent (e.g. [33, 89, 62]). Our competition experiments
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Figure 3-3: Relative producer fitness as a function of initial frequency in theory
( lines) and practice (points (*); mean ± s.e.m.; n=3). Asterisks represent poorly
mixed cultures (m low) while data points marked with an x represent better mixed
cultures (m high).
between isogenic SUC2 and suc2 knock-out strains of yeast confirm that selection for
invertase production is indeed negatively frequency-dependent (Figure 3-3). Our model
also predicts that increasing population structure modestly increases relative fitness of
producers, as a higher proportion of glucose goes to the producers (note different in-
tercepts of approximately parallel lines in (Figure 3-3). This result is also confirmed
by our experiments (Figure 3-3).
Given the observed negative frequency dependence, our model can also predict the
stable equilibrium frequencies of producers and non-producers under different experi-
mental regimes, these occurring when the relative fitnesses are the same. By fitting a
quadratic function to the observed data in Figure 3-3, for high m the experimental equi-
librium is estimated to be around 0.38 producers. The model predicts for m between
0.5 and 0.8 an equilibrium in the range of 0.31-0.39. For low m the observed equilibrium
position is estimated to be around 0.46, the predicted range (m from 0.4-0.1) is between
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Figure 3-4: The role of the rate-efficiency trade-off and the dynamics of sugar
metabolism. (a) Expected final population size(Log(titre)) after exhaustion of re-
sources as a function of initial producer frequency in the absence of rate-efficiency
trade-off. The temporal glucose spike, with glucose measured in mmolagar and time rep-
resented in hours, (b) when initially all the population are producers and (c) when
80% are producers with glucose measured in mmolagar and time is in hours. Note that
the spike in (c) is lower and longer-lived, hence glucoseis used more efficiently. (d) Ef-
ficiency of hexose usage by producers (g protein/mmol hexose) when non-producers
are present (80:20 ratio:left hand panel) and when they are absent, i.e. 100% pro-
ducers (right hand panel). Here we average across spatial structures.
0.42 and 0.55. We conclude that the model has a respectable ability to quantitatively
predict equilibrium frequencies. At equilibrium the population is predicted to have a
higher fitness than a population of only producers. The model equilibrium frequencies
are not the same as those that maximise population fitness. At equilibrium, there thus
remains a conflict between individual and group ”best interests”.
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3.1.1 Assumptions of benefits and costs and the peculiar behaviour
of population titre
Why does this model find that apparent cheats promote population growth where a
prior snowdrift formulation did not [33]? Might it be a consequence of features specific
to yeast and incorporated in our model or might it be owing to factors that are likely to
be more broadly applicable? To approach this we modify the model so as to determine
the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the core result, namely that population
growth is maximal in the presence of non-producers.
Our model makes assumptions about costs and benefits that are appropriate for our
situation but that are typically not configured in the more general-purpose heuristic
models of co-operation discussed above. We highlight two evident differences. First,
snowdrift assumes the benefit to be fixed and constant, such that the b term is the
same for all players gaining a benefit. More generally, game theoretical models usually
presume that each unit of resource gained represents one unit of benefit. This is not
true in yeast. While the growth rate is dependent on glucose concentrations, high local
concentrations lead to inefficient utilisation on a per molecule basis.
Similarly, the snowdrift game considers costs to be equally shared by all co-operators,
that cost is linearly proportional to work done, and that there is a fixed total cost to
removal of snow, this dictated by the amount of snow to be shoveled (e.g. co-operators
stop shoveling when the road is cleared). Importantly, yeast are prone to violating this
last assumption as they adjust their invertase production to the local glucose level,
not to the sucrose level, ensuring a disconnect between the amount of “co-operation”
needed (sucrose to be digested; snow to be shoveled) and the amount of “co-operation”
offered (invertase production; snow shoveled).
3.1.2 Removing rate-efficiency trade-off
Might modification of either of these biologically verified assumptions explain why
non-producers stimulate population growth? Leaving the observed costs in place, we
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find that removal of the assumption of the rate-efficiency trade-off restores the usual
assumption that population fitness is highest in the absence of cheats (Figure 3-4 A).
We can test the proposal that the rate-efficiency trade-off is important by making use
of a particular feature of yeast’s metabolism, namely that at very low sucrose levels
the rate efficiency trade-off is very weak or non-existent [104]. We thus repeated our
experiments at a very low sucrose level (0.01%) (see Appendix A Experimental Design
E) and observe just the predicted behaviour (Figure 3-5 A). This does not, however,
mean that the space in which maximal population fitness is associated with a mixture
of producers and non-producers need be limited. If we consider an intermediate sucrose
level, for example, we experimentally recover the humped distribution (Figure 3-5 B),
as predicted.
The rate-efficiency trade-off matters most if one considers the temporal trajectory
of co-operation and population growth. When producers are especially common, the
invertase production results in a large immediate spike, both spatial and temporal, in
glucose. This would enable rapid but inefficient growth. If we replace a few producers
with non-producers, the glucose spike would be smaller, so the population burns the
finite resource more efficiently. The net effect then is to ensure sucrose is more efficiently
converted to growth, but only if there is a rate-efficiency trade-off.
Consistent with this explanation, when producers are common, a high but short-
lived temporal (and spatial) peak in free-glucose is observed in the model (Figure 3-4 B),
compared with the rather slower and more protracted production seen when producers
are a little less common (Figure 3-4 C). An even lower level of producers ensures,
however, that internally metabolised sucrose is the predominant nutrient and this is
also inefficient. As then expected, the efficiency (conversion of hexose to protein) of
producers is radically degraded when the spike in glucose is observed, while a relatively
small reduction is seen when cheats are present, even in an 80:20 mix (Figure 3-4 D).
From examination of the time course we also observe that sucrose is typically ex-
hausted early on, but with invertase production being conditional on low glucose import
rates, the producers make expensive, but useless, invertase through much of the latter
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Figure 3-5: Experimental data for different sucrose levels. (A) Competition exper-
iments is performed in 0.01% of sucrose, in this case the rate-efficiency trade-off is
weak or not existing. In (B) the competition experiment is performed in 0.1% of
Sucrose recovering the hump distribution.
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part of the experiment (Figure 3-6 A-B). To employ the metaphor of the snowdrift
game, they are shoveling snow after the path is cleared. If invertase production is
costly, producers thus retard population growth rates once all the sucrose has been
hydrolysed. We should then expect that the population titre peak is more likely to
disappear as costs tend to zero. Indeed, we observe this in the model (Figure 3-6 C).
3.1.3 Having perfect information
Moreover, if yeast make invertase at a rate dependent upon the amount of sucrose
available (and don’t make invertase when sucrose is absent), we might also expect to find
the classical result of maximum productivity when cheats are absent. To examine this
we consider a model in which invertase production follows Michealis-Menten dynamics
as a function of sucrose levels, rather than glucose levels, with zero production when
sucrose is absent. This is equivalent to yeast having perfect information. As expected
we find that, even with a rate-efficiency trade-off and costly invertase production,
maximum population productivity occurs in the model when cheats are absent (Figure
3-7). Thus imperfect information is also required to yield the unexpected result. While
we provide an experimental test of the other predictions of our model (see above and
below) this one is not obviously amenable to experimental manipulation.
3.1.4 Removing spatial structure
Aside from these two assumptions, we also model a spatially structured population.
This is expected to be important as well- mixed populations share resources equally.
To this end we can consider what happens when m = 1. When this occurs the model
again recovers the classical result (Figure 3-8). We test this prediction by considering
what happens in very well shaken flasks (see Appendix A Experimental Design F),
thus providing the best approximation of an absence of population structure. As pre-
dicted, in well-mixed populations there is no evidence (to any measurable degree) that
population fitness is highest when producers and non-producers co-exist (Figure 3-9).
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Figure 3-6: The importance of costly invertase production and its coupling with
sucrose levels. (a) Sucrose and glucose levels (mmolagar ) across the time course of
the experiment ( in the vicinity of region 3); (b) corresponding invertase activity
levels( mmolglucosegprotein·hour ); time of sucrose exhaustion is indicated by vertical black lines for
m=0.8 and m=0.1. Note sucrose has disappeared relatively early but invertase is still
produced thereafter; (c) expected final population size (Log(titre)) after exhaustion
of resources as a function of initial co-operator frequency when cost of invertase
production is reduced from 4% to 2% for invertase production of 86.7 mmol glucose/g
protein /hour that is 12% higher than the base-level invertase production.
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Figure 3-7: Theoretical expectations for titre when invertase production matches
sucrose levels (perfect information).
Figure 3-8: Theoretical prediction of a homogeneous environment
3.1.5 The economics of inefficiency
The above demonstrates that three features are required to recover our non-classical re-
sult that population fitness is maximal in the presence of non-producers. Modifications
of some of these features can be seen as removal of an inefficiency that would otherwise
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Figure 3-9: Experimental data of the competition experiment performed in flask:
homogeneous environment
retard population growth when producers are especially common: the rate-efficiency
trade-off ensures that glucose is not used as efficiently as it might be; the costly in-
vertase production being uncoupled to sucrose levels provides an evident inefficiency.
Population structure contributes to inefficiency by ensuring that some cells suffer costs
while reaping poor benefits, owing to the rate- efficiency trade-off and to being exposed
to the spike in glucose.
Given this, why is it that removal of just one inefficiency, leaving the others, can
restore the classical result? To see this consider that, while producers may be ineffi-
cient in some regards, they also diminish an inefficiency, as they convert inefficiently
used sucrose into more efficiently used glucose. The question is not whether there
are any inefficiencies but rather whether their net decelerating effects outweigh their
net accelerating effects (removal of inefficiency). Importantly, modification of just one
cost/inefficiency has consequences for the others, potentially amplifying effects. For
example, removal of cost has the direct consequence of faster growth of producers.
However, as a knock-on effect, the population uses less sucrose, thus diminishing a
further inefficiency. The effect is non-trivial, however, as it is further modulated by the
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rate-efficiency trade-offs.
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CHAPTER 4
Spatial Structure and the polymorphic secretion of invertase.
Natural environments are inherently spatially structured. For instance soil, biofilms
and the sea have a heterogeneous spatial structure that allows the formation of dif-
ferent niches, supporting a wide diversity of species. The sea, for example, despite
its continuous movement producing turbulent mixing, has several structured environ-
ments. For instance light creates degrees of luminosity and non-uniform temperature
gradients, with sharp transitions known as thermoclines that in turn are responsible
for changes in the local density of water. All these differences in physicochemical prop-
erties of the sea are particularly relevant for microorganisms and therefore diversity of
microbes in the sea is enormous [93].
This spatial structure is not exclusive of natural environments, truly homogeneous
environments are difficult to find even in laboratory systems; microbial microcosms
present gradients on a small scale like vessel walls, colony growth, biofilms or the
formation of clumps. Moreover, spatial structure can emerge from a homogeneous
environment due to the interaction between the environment and a heterogeneous pop-
ulation composed of different phenotypes. For this reason, understanding how micro-
organisms behave and evolve in structured environments is an important ecological and
evolutionary question.
52
Chapter 4. Spatial Structure and the polymorphic secretion of invertase.
In particular, spatial structure is known to be an important factor in the mainte-
nance and evolution of co-operation [65, 74, 21, 56, 100, 86]. For instance, one of the
most widely-accepted theories explaining the emergence of multicellularity is based on
unicellular organisms co-operating in a spatially structured environment [80, 54, 45, 37].
This major evolutionary transition could be a consequence of different cells clustering
and grouping together as individuals.
Previous theoretical results focus on understanding the consequences of spatial
structure using evolutionary game theory. For example, a Prisoner’s Dilemma in which
a one-shot play makes defection a stable strategy can switch to a dynamics where co-
operation is a stable strategy when spatial structure is taken into consideration [70],
although, this is not always the case, there are examples showing that under certain
conditions, spatial structure can inhibit cooperation [43].
The fact that spatial structure is important for the maintenance of co-operation is
not a surprising result, particularly when competition for consumption and exploita-
tion of common resources are involved (as is the case presented in this thesis). Spatial
structure can help individuals paying high costs to remain in the vicinity of the public
goods they produce for longer, allowing them to exploit the resources themselves. Spa-
tial structure can also limit the dispersal of the good produced, and increased inclusive
fitness by allow them to share the goods preferentially with their kin. This process
can lead to the creation of patchy structures that support co-operators. Of course, this
argument is not as straightforward as it appears, because as discussed in the previous
chapter, individuals with a high amount of resources available may use them ineffi-
ciently, and therefore this may only be relevant under resource limitation. Temporal
structure is also relevant for the maintenance of co-operation, as will be discussed in
the following chapter.
In this chapter we will use a theoretical approach to evaluate the effect of spatial
structure in the public goods game presented in the previous chapters. To achieve this,
we will modify the model constructed in Chapter 2 in order to consider the spatial
component of the system explicitly by formulating a system of PDEs. Subsequently
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we will use numerical simulations to show that the results presented so far in this
thesis are robust to different spatial distribution of cells and resources. Finally, we will
discuss how spatial structure can affect the long-term co-existence between producers
and non-producers.
4.1 Modelling spatial structure explicitly
Mathematical and computational models of spatially structured biological systems
come in different shapes and sizes. Classically, reaction-diffusion models have widely
been used for describing physical situations such as heat conduction in a one-dimensional
solid body, spread of a dye in a stationary fluid, population dispersion, and other sim-
ilar processes. One of the most important contributions regarding this topic was done
by Alan Turing who in 1952 studied the emergence of structures in a developing embryo
using a reaction-diffusion system [97].
To derived a one dimension reaction diffusion equation, consider a particle moving
in a line located at x = 0 at the time t = 0. The particle can move to the right (r) or
to the left (l) a distance δx in a time δt with a probability p(x, t) As both movements
are independent therefore:
pl = l[p(x+ δx, t− δt)]
pr = r[p(x− δx, t− δt)].
if we consider the particle can’t stay in the same place then p(x, t) = pl(x, t) + pr(x, t).
Expanding p(x + δx, t − δt) and p(x − δx, t − δt) in a Taylor series in the vicinity of
(x, t)
p(x+ δx, t− δt) = p(x, t) + δx∂p
∂x
− δt∂p
∂t
+
(δx)2
2
∂2p
∂x2
+ ...
p(x− δx, t− δt) = p(x, t)− δx∂p
∂x
− δt∂p
∂t
+
(δx)2
2
∂2p
∂x2
+ ...
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therefore
p(x, t) = l(p(x, t)+δx
∂p
∂x
−δt∂p
∂t
+
(δx)2
2
∂2p
∂x2
+...)+r(p(x, t)−δx∂p
∂x
−δt∂p
∂t
+
(δx)2
2
∂2p
∂x2
+...)+...
notice that l + r = 1 and introducing β = r − l
p(x, t) = p(x, t)− βδx∂p
∂x
− δt∂p
∂t
+
(δx)2
2
∂2p
∂x2
+O(δt2, δx3),
as (δt > 0)
∂p
∂t
= −(βδx
δt
)
δp
δx
+
(δx)2
2δt
δ2p
δx2
.
defining the finite limits :
v = lim
δx,δt→0
−βδx
δt
D = lim
δx,δt→0
(δx)2
2δt
then
∂p
∂x
= v
∂p
∂x
+D
∂2p
∂x2
where v is the advection coefficient and D is the diffusion coefficient. If the medium is
homogeneous, (i.e. l = r = 12) then β = 0 and v = 0 and the equation can be written
as follows:
∂p
∂t
= D
∂2p
∂x2
.
With the increase in computing power individual-based models and cellular automata
have increased in popularity and have proven particularly successful in modelling spa-
tially complex ecological interactions [55, 107].
Individual based models focus on how macroscopic behaviour emerges from local
interactions of individuals, if they are spatially explicit the individuals are associated
with a particular location in the domain. Each individual in these simulations is au-
tonomous and interact with each other and the environment under given autonomous
rules.
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In contrast, cellular automata models assume a fixed spatial grid where all indi-
viduals are identical and the space is dense and uniform. Individuals evolve through
a number of discrete time steps under a certain set of rules depending on their own
state and the state of their neighbours, such rules are iterated for a determined length
of time.
Here we will use a continuous model, based on reaction-diffusion as we will assume
that the three carbon sources (glucose, fructose and sucrose) act as reactants and diffuse
throughout space. In contrast to the assumption of the previous chapter, where yeast
has been considered non-motile, here we take into account that as colonies grow, The
spreading of the cells in a colony is a passive, mechanical process, due to generation of
pressure inside the colony due to volume increase due to growth, then yeast cells will
disperse slowly through the domain (ie. the diameter of colonies will increase in size,
as observed experimentally).
For simplicity we will consider a one-dimensional spatial domain Ω = [0, l], this
can be done because the dynamic of the system is the same in all direction, adding
more dimension wouldn’t change the outcome, and without loss of generality we set
l = 1. We define Np(t, x) and Nnp(t, x) as the densities of producers and non-producers,
respectively, at time t and in the spatial location x with x ∈ Ω. Similarly S(t, x), G(t, x)
and F (x, t) denote sucrose, glucose and fructose concentrations, respectively, at time t
and in the spatial location x. Extending the metabolic model described in Chapter 2
to include the above elements we arrive at:
∂S
∂t
= Ds
∂2S
∂x2
− JS · (Np+Nn)− Inv ·Np (4.1a)
∂G
∂t
= Dg
∂2G
∂x2
− JG · (Np+Nn) + Inv ·Np (4.1b)
∂F
∂t
= Df
∂2F
∂x2
− JF · (Np+Nn) + Inv ·Np (4.1c)
∂Np
∂t
= DNp
∂2Np
∂x2
+ (1− cInv) · (nHxte (JG + JF ) · (JG + JF ) + nSe · JS) ·Np (4.1d)
∂Nnp
∂t
= DNnp
∂2Nnp
∂x2
+ (nHxte (J
G + JF ) · (JG + JF ) + nSe · JS) ·Nn. (4.1e)
where different D′s denote diffusion constants with subscripts referring to each state
variable. In particular Ds =
Dg
2 ;Dnp = Dp << Df = Dg. For simulation proposes
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diffusion coefficients have the following values: Dnp = Dp = 1 × 10−6 finally Dg =
Df = 1× 10−3 and Dg = 12Ds, x has dimensionless space units and therefore diffusion
coefficients has units of space
2
time .
In order to ensure that outcomes of the model are determined completely by the
interactions described in the model (4.1a-e), we impose no-flux boundary conditions at
x = 0 and x = 1:
Sx(t, 0) = Gx(t, 0) = Fx(t, 0) = 0,
Sx(t, 1) = Gx(t, 1) = Fx(t, 1) = 0.
Npx(t, 0) = Nnpx(t, 0) = 0,
Npx(t, 1) = Nnpx(t, 1) = 0.
We define the initial conditions as
S(0, x) = S0, G(0, x) = G0, F (0, x) = F0, Np0(x) and Nnp(0, x) = Nnp0(x)
where S0, G0 and F0 are constants and the form of Np0(x) and Nnp0(x) will depend on
the case under consideration, as discussed in the following section. In this simulations
S0 = 1.17mmolg and it is uniformly distributed in the domain. Numerical simulations
presented in this chapter were performed using Matlab’s built-in solver pdepe. Space
is measured in dimensionless spacial units, and time in dimensionless time units.
4.2 Outcomes of the model for varying initial population
structures
In the simulations presented in this chapter, the only resource that is initially present
in the environment is sucrose which is uniformly distributed throughout the domain.
Here we consider different initial spatial distributions of producers (Np0(x)) and non-
producers (Nnp0(x)) and explore their effect on the overall fitness of the population.
57
Chapter 4. Spatial Structure and the polymorphic secretion of invertase.
We will examine interactions between producers and non-producers over short-time
scale and genetic and regulatory changes will no be taken into account and instead the
system will be considered from a purely ecological perspective.
In particular we consider the following two cases:
• Case I: Both cell types ( producers and non-producers) are uniformly distributed
across the entire domain (Figure 4-1) .
• Case II: Each cell type is placed in a patch with varying distances between the
patches (Figure 4-4) and varying number of patches (Figure 4-9).
In order to compare the outcome of the spatially explicit system (eq 4.1) and the
one where space is modelled phenomenologically (eq 2.3) the parameters that do not
relate to mass transfer are kept the same in the two models.
Case I: Uniform distribution of both cell types
D
en
si
ty
 
x 
Producers 
Non-producers 
Figure 4-1: Uniform initial distribution for both populations; producers and non-
producers
Using the initial yeast distribution illustrated in Figure 4-1 we perform a series
of numerical simulations differing in the initial frequency of producers while keeping
constant the total cell density of producers and non-producers put together. The
simulations are run for t∗ (until the resources have been exhausted) and, as in Chapter
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2, for each initial producer frequency we record the total population size at the end of
the numerical run
∫ 1
0 (Np(t
∗, x) +Nnp(t∗, x))dx.
The initial conditions of the distribution of cells is as follows where x ∈ [0, 1] denotes
a position in the space, Np denotes the initial distribution of Producers at t = 0, and
Nn the initial distribution of Non-producers at t = 0.
Lets denote f the fraction of Producers in the initial population and N the initial
amount of biomass in the population.
f = NpNp+Nnp
N = 6.5× 10−7
Np =
{
f ·N 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
}
Nn =
{
(1− f) ·N 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
}
As for the case where spatial structure is modelled phenomenologically (Chapter 2)
we find that population fitness (measured as the population density - Titre) peaks when
a combination of both producers and non-producers are present in the population as
shown in Figure 4-2 B. However, in contrast to the phenomenological model (eq. 2.3),
the relative fitness of producers for the spatially explicit system (eq. 4.1) is always less
than 1 (Figure 4-2 A). Given that the stable equilibrium frequency of producers and
non-producers occurs when the relative fitness of producers (to non-producers) is 1, in
this case our model predicts that eventually non-producers will outcompete producers.
The above finding can be explained as follows. Focusing on the spatial and tem-
poral distribution of resources we find that at any given time point all three resources
are uniformly distributed across the domain (Figure 4-3) making all resources equally
accessible to both producers and non-producers. The cost that producers pay to break
down sucrose into glucose and fructose ensures that the fitness of producers is always
lower than that of non-producers.
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Figure 4-2: Relative Fitness of Producers and Titre as a function of initial frequency
of producers. Uniform distribution of a mixed population at the beginning of the
simulation
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Figure 4-3: Dynamic of resources (sucrose, glucose and fructose) in time when
producers and non producers start at 0.5− 0.5 in frequency.
Case II:Distribution of two patches with each patch containing one of the
two different cell types.
Using the yeast distribution illustrated in Figure 4-4 we perform a series of numerical
simulation as described above in Case I. In addition we consider the robustness of these
results with respect to varying distances between the two patches.
The first simulation has an initial distribution of cells as follows, parameters had
been previously define in Case I.
60
Chapter 4. Spatial Structure and the polymorphic secretion of invertase.
D
en
si
ty
 
x 
Producers 
Non-producers 
δ 
Figure 4-4: Initial distribution of cells: two different patches of producers and non-
producers separated by a distance δ.
Np =

0 0 ≤ x < 0.46
f ·N 0.46 ≤ x ≤ 0.53
0 0.53 < x ≤ 1

Nn =

0 0 ≤ x < 0.53
(1− f) ·N 0.50 ≤ x ≤ 0.57
0 0.57 < x ≤ 1

For a fixed distance between the producer and non-producer patch (δ), we find that
as in Case I, population fitness peaks when a combination of both producers and non-
producers are present in the population as shown in Figure 4-5 (b). However, contrary
to Case I there is a stable equilibrium frequency of producers and non-producers since
the relative fitness of producers crosses the line of equal fitness (Figure 4-5 (a)).
On inspection of the spatial and temporal dynamics of the three resources (Figure
4-6), we observe that the highest concentrations of glucose and fructose can be found in
the left part of the domain where producers are initially located. This provides sufficient
benefit to producers, which counteracts the cost of making invertase preventing the
extinction of producers.
Increasing the distance between the initial patches (by increasing the value of δ)
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increases the equilibrium frequency of producers (Figure 4-7 A) but removes the ben-
eficial contribution of non-producers to the population fitness with population fitness
now being maximised if everyone in the population is a producer (Figure 4-7 B).
Increasing the distance between the patches results in a initial distribution of cells
as follows. The parameters were defined in Case I.
Np =

0 0 ≤ x < 0.30
f ·N 0.30 ≤ x ≤ 0.35
0 0.35 < x ≤ 1

Nn =

0 0 ≤ x < 0.65
(1− f) ·N 0.63 ≤ x ≤ 0.70
0 0.70 < x ≤ 1

Figure 4-5: Relative Fitness of Producers and Titre as a function of the Initial
Frequency of producers. The cells are initially located in two different patches,
producers to the left and non producers in the right side of the domain,(δ = .04).
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Increasing the number of patches in the initial cell distribution (Figure 4-9) does
not qualitatively change the outcome which can be seen by comparing Figure 4-5 with
Figure 4-7. We increased the number of patches to be four, two of each strain , and
the initial spatial distribution at time t = 0 is as follows:
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Figure 4-6: Consumption of resources in time when producers and non producers
start at equal frequencies.
Figure 4-7: Relative Fitness of Producers and Titre as a function of the Initial
Frequency of producers. The cells are initially located in two different patches,
producers to the left and non producers in the right side of the domain( δ = .34)
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Np =

0 0 ≤ x < 0.30
f ·N · 0.5 0.30 ≤ x ≤ 0.35
0 0.35 < x ≤ 0.45
f ·N · 0.5 0.45 ≤ x0.50
0 0.50 < x ≤ 1

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Figure 4-8: Dynamics of resources in time when producers and non producers starts
at 0.5− 0.5 in frequency.
Nn =

0 0 ≤ x < 0.37
(1− f) ·N · 0.5 0.37 ≤ x ≤ 0.42
0 0.42 < x < 0.52
(1− f) ·N · 0.5 0.52 ≤ x ≤ 0.57
0 0.57 < x
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Figure 4-9: Initial distribution of four intercalated patches
Summary
In this section we have demonstrated that the result obtained in Chapter 3, namely that
the population fitness is maximised when a combination of both producers and non-
64
Chapter 4. Spatial Structure and the polymorphic secretion of invertase.
Figure 4-10: Relative Fitness of Producers and Titre as a function of the Initial
Frequency of Producers for the 4 patches initial distribution of cells, (δ = 0.07)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
Initial Frequency of Producers
R
el
at
iv
e 
Fi
tn
es
s 
of
 P
ro
du
ce
rs
(a) A Relative Fitness
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
9.7
Initial Frequency of Producers
Ti
tre
(b) B Titre
producers is present in the population, is not just a peculiarity of the way the spatial
structure was modelled. We find that both the phenomenological and spatially explicit
models give rise to the same result. The fact that cheats can sometimes actually benefit
the population they are in is therefore a result of the ecological dynamics between yeast
cells and their environment.
In addition we find that spatial structure of a population affects the long-term coex-
istence between invertase producers and non-producers. We observe that the availabil-
ity of glucose and fructose in the spatial locations containing non-producers must be
smaller than the resource availability in the spatial locations containing producers for
the coexistence to be possible. In agreement with prior theoretical studies our results
support the idea that patchy structure supports the maintenance of cooperation while
homogeneous environments support cheating. This can be explained in the following
way. A patchy structure allows producers to retain the glucose that they produce for
longer periods of time than would otherwise be the case in well-mixed environments.
This ensures that at least some of the benefit of producing invertase is kept by the
producers without having to share it with non-producers. However, if the diffusion of
resources is high, the environment becomes more homogeneous and producers can end
up losing their produced resources to non-producing individuals.
Although in our model patchy structure is artificially introduced through the initial
65
Chapter 4. Spatial Structure and the polymorphic secretion of invertase.
distribution of cells, there are some recent studies suggesting that clumping can be
advantageous for both nutrient acquisition and protection, therefore can be the initial
step for the evolution of multicellularity [37, 83].
4.3 Predicting the long-term coexistence of producers and
non-producers
It is important to point out that the experimental data and the numerical simulations
presented so far in this thesis have been conducted for a fixed time period representing
dynamics within a single season. We define the length of a season as the time it takes
for all resources to be exhausted and for the population to reach a stationary phase.
However, the negative-frequency dependence plots produced in this thesis (e.g Fig-
ure 4-2(a) and Figure 4-6(a)) do not identify all possible long-term equilibria of our
system. In particular the temporal structure such as the length of a season will have
an effect on the long-term dynamics and this will be explored in the final chapter of
this thesis.
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Seasonal dynamics and long-term coexistence
What maintains diversity, be it in ecosystems or within populations, remains one of
the central issues in biology. In particular, spatial and temporal heterogeneity are
well-established drivers of diversity [16]. In this chapter we will consider both spatially
and temporally heterogeneous environments and ask a different set of questions. Does
the way a population disperses and re-colonises affect the long-term equilibrium? Will
there be a unique outcome? Could any equilibrium be derived from considering a
single-season dynamics? Alternatively, are there multiple stable solutions depending
on the initial conditions? These questions are relevant not only to real-world ecology
and evolution but also to the design of protocols for laboratory-based evolutionary
experiments.
In the previous chapters, we analysed our model system in order to find conditions
that maximised population fitness when producers and non-producer of invertase were
competing in a spatially structured environment, within one season and with limiting
availability of resources. Here we are interested in answering what is the long-term equi-
librium, and what are the necessary conditions for maintaining long term co-existence
in this system? Furthermore, we will discuss a set of experimental results based on
the system studied throughout this thesis, examining the robustness of different ex-
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perimental protocols with respect to the mechanism in which the spatial structure is
maintained between seasons.
5.1 Seasonality and the invertase system
Imagine a population of invertase producers and non-producers growing on sucrose in
a spatially structured environment. Imagine too that such a population is allowed to
mature until all the sugar (sucrose, glucose and fructose) is exhausted, when resources
are completely depleted we will call it a complete season.
The second season is initiated by transferring cells from the end of the first season
into a new environment with the same initial sugar content as the previous one. We
consider two ways of transferring between environments that mirror real-world between-
season ecologies. The first protocol is such that spatial structure is not maintained
between seasons, which may be comparable to migratory species that re-colonise a
summer feeding ground randomly [51, 79] and therefore will be referred to as migratory
regime. Alternatively, we consider what might happen if spatial structure is maintained
between seasons, a protocol that we will call non-migratory regime. This is similar to a
non-migratory species in which over-wintering is done at the physical location at which
an organism is found at the end of the summer growing season.
In practice the migratory transfer method is performed by washing cells off the old
plate, mixing them thoroughly and then spreading a sample across the surface of a new
plate; we expect a unique long-term equilibrium between producers and non-producers
to be established. In contrast, the non-migratory transfer can be achieved experimen-
tally using replica-plating to maintain spatial structure, under this method cells from
the old plate are transferred to a sterile velvet stamp that is used to inoculate the new
plate, maintaining the spatial position between cells. This regime has historically had
two main applications: isolation of new mutants and the classification of colonies that
are different from each other in the nutritional requirements [28, 57, 85].
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In both protocols the initial resource concentrations are the same between seasons,
as well as the initial population sizes. The duration of each season is defined as the
moment when all resources have been exhausted, taking complete seasons. At first
sight, it is not obvious that the transfer regimes make a big difference to the population
dynamics. Indeed, very few studies in the experimental evolution literature discuss the
significance of such differences [49, 39, 38].
(a) (b)
Figure 5-1: In panel (a) the spatial structure is not maintained between seasons:
in each transfer the population is taken out of the plate and vortexed in a test
tube, before a sample of this mixture is re-inoculated in an agar plate with fresh
growth medium. In panel (b) the protocol preserves (as much as possible) the spatial
structure between seasons by using a velvet and a velvet tool to press the old agar
plate into it. This method leaves an impression which is then transferred into an
agar plate with fresh medium.
5.2 Long-term experiments for the invertase system
In order to examine experimentally the difference between both experimental protocols
(Figure 5-1) we decided to perform long-term experiments. I was invited by Dr. Duncan
Greig to visit his lab at the Max Planck Institute of Evolutionary Biology in Plo¨n,
Germany, to undertake the experiments described in the following section.
5.2.1 Experimental methods
We used two isogenic strains, SUC2 (a/α, leu2/leu2, his5/his5, ura3/ura3, SUC2/SUC2)
and suc2, an isogenic diploid strain in which both copies of SUC2 have been replaced
by KanMX. For all experiments, initial cultures of yeast were grown overnight in stan-
dard YEPD medium at a temperature of 30◦ c in the incubator. For the propagation of
mixed communities, cultures were inoculated and grown in sucrose synthetic medium
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Producers (%) Non-producers (%)
10 90
30 70
50 50
70 30
90 10
Table 5.1: Initial population cultures in percentage.
in 25 mL agar plates with a concentration of sucrose of 20 g/L (2%) .
For the long-term experiment, mixed communities of invertase producers and non-
producers were propagated and the frequency of each type was tracked each season
under the transfer protocols previously discussed. To determine the size of the sample
that will be transferred each season, ten plates were replica plated and both the old and
the new samples were cut using a sterile scalpel and placed into tubes containing 5mL
of sterile water. The tubes were vortexed and a sample of the solution was counted in
the hemocytometer to determine the percentage of cells of each sub-population.
The initial populations started with five different initial frequencies (proportion of
producers/non-producers) and five replicas of each experiment were done:
Suspensions containing the five initial frequencies were prepared and the frequencies
were tested by counting growing colonies. One single patch of 5 µL of each initial
frequency was placed in the middle of a 25 mL Petri dish containing 2% sucrose in the
medium. All populations were allowed to grow for six days at a temperature of 30◦C
in the incubator. After the sixth day, a sample from each population was transferred
into fresh plates and the cycle was repeated.
The frequency of the producers and non-producers was determined after each cycle
by diluting the suspension 4-fold and then cultivating a sample of the resulting popula-
tion into standard YEPD and YEPD with added antibiotic G148 plates and counting
colonies to determine the resulting frequency. The suc2 strain is the only one that
can survive in G148 YPD media because the marker KanMX make them antibiotic
resistant.
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For Protocol 1 (Migratory Regime), after 6 days patches from each plate were cut
from the plates with a sterile scalpel and placed into tubes containing 5 mL of sterile
water. Then the tubes were vortexed for 1 minute and a 5 µL of the suspension was
placed in a new plate with fresh medium.
For Protocol 2 (Non-Migratory Regime), after 6 days each plate was transferred
using replica plating tool where a sterile velvet was placed, an exact printing of the
plate was taken by pressing the plate on the velvet, then a new plate with fresh medium
was pressed on the same velvet, obtaining an exact copy of the old plate.
The experiment lasted seven seasons for both protocols and each season lasted six
days.
5.2.2 Results
At the end of each season, the proportion of producers in the resulting population was
counted. As we can observe from the results presented in Figure 5-2(a) and Figure 5-
2(b), the data obtained is inconclusive. There is not a clear difference in the population
dynamics of both protocols, and in seven seasons our experiment failed to reach an
equilibrium (due to time constraints we could not continue the experiments).
For both protocols, however, there is a clear tendency for the fraction of producers to
increase over time, although for Protocol 2 this is not the case for all initial conditions.
Our experiment was conducted for seasons of fixed length (6 days) and a fixed
number of seasons (7 seasons). To systematically explore the dynamics between seasons
under different parameter ranges, we carried out a theoretical analysis by introducing
temporal structure into the mathematical model described by equations (eq. 2.3). The
reason for using the model described in Chapter 2 is its proven ability to consistently
make not just qualitatively but also quantitatively predictions. Furthermore, extending
this model allows us to test experimentally the predictions of the model.
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5.2.3 Theoretical approach to studying seasonal environments
The system of equations (eq. 2.3) developed in Chapter 2 describes the competition
dynamics between two yeast types within a single season. Here we adapt this model to
evaluate what happens to the competing types after a number of seasons. In order to
optimise the numerical simulations some of the functions estimated in Chapter 2 were
re-fitted using polynomial fitting included later in this chapter.
At the beginning of the first season, all environments are initiated with the same
amount of sucrose (S0) and the same total cell number (N0), but we allow the ratio
of producers to non-producers (f) and the degree of mixing (m) to vary. Note that
initially there is no glucose or fructose present in the environment, these resources
only appear once sucrose is hydrolysed through invertase. The initial conditions at the
beginning of the first season can therefore be defined as follows:
S1(0) = (1−m)fS0, Np1(0) = (1−m)fN0,
S2(0) = (1−m)(1− f)S0, Nn2(0) = (1−m)(1− f)N0,
S3(0) = mS0, Np3(0) = mfN0 and Nn3(0) = m(1− f)N0,
with Gi(0) = 0 and Fi(0) = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3 denoting the different regions of the model.
Cells grow and compete for resources until all sugars (sucrose, glucose and fructose)
are exhausted, denoting the end of the season. The subsequent season is initiated
by transferring a small fraction of the total number of cells from the previous season
into the fresh environment. The beginning of each season is denoted by the time T j0
while the time it takes for the resources to be depleted is denoted by T jend, where the
superscript j represents the season number.
As mentioned before, we will consider two mechanisms by which the transfer be-
tween seasons can be achieved: a migratory regime (Figure 5-1 a) and a non-migratory
regime (Figure 5-1 b).
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5.2.4 Migratory regime
If Np(T
j
end) and Nn(T
j
end) denote respectively the total number of producers and non-
producers at the end of j-th season, then the fraction of producers at the end of j-th
season is defined as:
f j =
Np(T
j
end)
Np(T
j
end) +Nn(T
j
end)
.
Then the initial conditions for the j + 1-st season can be written as:
S1(T
j+1
0 ) = (1−m)f jS0, Np1(T j+10 ) = (1−m)f jN0,
S2(T
j+1
0 ) = (1−m)(1− f j)S0, Nn2(T j+10 ) = (1−m)(1− f j)N0,
S3(T
j+1
0 ) = mS0, Np3(T
j+1
0 ) = mf
jN0,
and Nn3(T
j+1
0 ) = m(1− f j)N0,
with Gi(T
j+1
0 ) = 0 and Fi(T
j+1
0 ) = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3.
5.2.5 Non-migratory regime
The initial condition for the j + 1-st season can be written as
gj =
1
Np(T
j
end) +Nn(T
j
end)
S1(T
j+1
0 ) = (1−m)f jS0, Np1(T j+10 ) = gjNp1(T jend)N0,
S2(T
j+1
0 ) = (1−m)(1− f j)S0, Nn2(T j+10 ) = gjNn2(T jend)N0,
S3(T
j+1
0 ) = mS0, Np3(T
j+1
0 ) = g
jNp3(T
j
end)N0,
and Nn3(T
j+1
0 ) = g
jNn3(T
j
end)N0,
with Gi(T
j+1
0 ) = 0 and Fi(T
j+1
0 ) = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3.
In both regimes the transfers were carried out while |f j+1−f j | > , where  denotes
a constant associated with a numerical error with ≈ O(10−7).
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5.2.6 Competition in seasonal environments and stability analysis
Note that for the non-migratory regime the population structure is in itself a changing
trait: even if producers and non-producers start with the same proportion, the following
season this structure may well be different and therefore the end-result can also be
different.
In contrast, under the migratory regime at the start of each season the population-
structure, m, is reset and thus m cannot evolve. Therefore the only parameter changing
between seasons is the proportion of producers, as defined in Section 5.2.4. For this
reason, although the long-term equilibria for the migratory regime can be determined
using stability analysis, this method cannot be employed for the non-migratory regime.
Furthermore, as the migratory regime can be written as an iterative map, we can
use a cobweb method to describe its dynamics and find the long-term equilibria of the
system from a single-season dynamics.
Let us define a map as a function of the form Rn+1 = Γ(Rn) where R0 is a set
of initial conditions. If R∗ satisfy Γ(R∗) = R∗ then R∗ will be a fix point of the
system. In this thesis we will use the cobweb method to determine the stability of the
fix points, as explained below. Graphically the steady states are intersections of the
curve Rn+1 = Γ(Rn) and Rn+1 = Rn and the dynamic evolution of the solution Rn
can be obtained graphically as follows. Suppose we start with R0 then R1 is given by
drawing a vertical line through R0 until it intersects the curve Rn+1 = Γ(Rn) which
gives R1 = Γ(R0). Next we draw a horizontal line through Γ(R0) until it intersects the
diagonal Rn+1 = Rn which gives us a new initial condition R1 and the process starts
again with R1 in place of R0.
In our system, using single-season dynamics (cobweb maps) in a complete season
scenario (when all resources have been exhausted), we should observe a unique stable
equilibrium and this is indeed the case for the values m = 0.2 and m = 0.8, as illustrated
in Figure 5-3(a-b).
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We are also interested in studying what happens when resources have not been
exhausted, a condition that will be referred to as an incomplete season. Using again
stability analysis, we find that different equilibria are achieved for incomplete seasons.
For example, in Figure 5-4(a) we find that there is no co-existence, and 0 and 1 are
both stable equilibria of the system. Similarly, Figure 5-4(b) illustrates a case where
we still find two different stable equilibria, but in contrast with the previous case, those
equilibria present co-existence at different fractions of producers.
In order to compare the two different protocols, we constructed bifurcation diagrams
of both regimes (Migratory and Non-Migratory). For each one we simulated different
initial conditions and plotted the stable equilibria of the system at each transfer time,
0 < T < 250. For each value of T we iterate the system a fixed number of times
(N = 300) with initial conditions described in Section 5.2.4 for the migratory regime
and Section 5.2.5 for the non-migratory regime. Using different initial proportion of
producers we iterated the system and plotted the values computed for the last 50
iterations, and thus visualising both stable equilibria and periodic orbits.
For each transfer regime we considered two different mixing parameters, one with
a high degree of mixing (m = 0.8) and one with a low degree of mixing (m = 0.2) and
obtained the bifurcation diagrams shown in Figure 5-5. Note that for both regimes and
for both values of m, no co-existence is found if the transfer time is short (0 < T < 100).
The final equilibrium is determined by the initial proportion of producers, and either
strain can outcompete the other. Furthermore, notice that for m = 0.8 and T ≥ 100,
the stable equilibrium is unique for all initial conditions and the system presents co-
existence between both strains (Figures 5-5(b) and 5-5(d)).
In contrast, for m = 0.2 the result is rather different, as illustrated in Figure 5-
5(a) and Figure 5-5(c). After the value of T at which no co-existence is found (T =
100), the system presents multiple stable equilibria. For the migratory regime at some
intermediate times (100 < T < 180 ) we observe two different equilibria for each value of
T , as was indeed predicted from the stability analysis. As the time increases (T ≥ 180),
the bubble collapses into a single stable equilibrium.
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The non-migratory regime presents a more complex dynamics, as illustrated in
Figure 5-5(c). Instead of just possessing at most two stable equilibria for each value
of T , there appears to be a cascade of period-doubling bifurcations, an indicator of
chaotic dynamics. This feature is illustrated in more detail in Figure 5-6. Performing
a rigorous mathematical analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis and a matter for
further research.
5.3 Polynomial fitting
Polynomial fitting were estimated using Matlab’s built-in polynomial fitting tool in the
least squares sense from the functions described in Chapter 2.
• Efficiency of hexoses nHxt = 3.9×10−9 · (JG+JF )5−6.728×10−7 · (JG+JF )4−
5.9×10−4 ·(JG+JF )3−1×10−3 ·(JG+JF )2+1.044×10−3(JG+JF )+4.777×10−2.
• Efficiency of Sucrose nS = 4.182785 × 10−9 · JS8 − 3.00355268 × 10−7 · JS7 +
8.660780388× 10−6 · JS6 − 1.26960896486× 10−4 · JS5 + 9.77018981074× 10−4 ·
JS
4−3.543231508268×10−4·JS3+3.639336246873×10−3·JS2+1.130598427030×
10−3 · JS + 2.9024713958809× 10−2.
• Sucrose Uptake Rate JS = −62.90 · S8 + 429.7 · S7 − 1193.0 · S6 + 1723.3 · S5 −
1381.0 · S4 + 616.7 · S3 − 162.9 · S2 + 38.8 · S.
• Competition parameter for Fructose KFc = −2.12 × 10−2 · (F 6) + 5.08 × 10−2 ·
F 5)+1.259×10−1 ·F 4−5.430·F 3+6.493×10−1 ·F 2−2.990×10−1 ·F+519×10−2.
• Competition parameter for Glucose KGc = −0.1167 ·(G6)−0.3946 ·(G5)+4.4219 ·
(G4)− 10.7498 · (G3) + 11.0073 · (G2)− 4.777 ·G+ 0.7248.
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(a) Experimental data under Protocol 1: Migratory Regime (Y1 represents the
population of invertase producers)
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(b) Experimental data under Protocol 2: Non-Migratory Regime (Y1 represents
the population of invertase producers)
Figure 5-2: Experimental data from both protocols, migratory regime and non-
migratory regime, each season correspond to 6 days..
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(a) For m = 0.2 and T = 200 the system presents a single stable equilibrium.
(b) For m = 0.8, T = 200 the system presents a single stable equilibrium.
Figure 5-3: Cobweb map for a complete season scenario where all resources have
been depleted for different mixing parameters.
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(a) m = 0.2 and T = 50
(b) m = 0.2 and T = 140
Figure 5-4: In an incomplete season (T = 50 and T = 140) different equilibria are
found. (a) Two stable equilibria are found in 0 and 1, showing no co-existence of
the two strains. (b) This case also presents two stable equilibria, but in this case
co-existence is observed at two different proportions of producers and non-producers.
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(a) Migratory Regime m=0.2
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(b) MigratoryRegime m=0.8
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(c) Non-Migratory Regime m=0.2
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(d) Non-Migratory Regime m=0.8
Figure 5-5: Bifurcation diagrams comparing the migratory and non-migratory
regimes for values m = 0.2 and m = 0.8.
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5.4 Simple model
Is the observed chaos a consequence of the transfer regime between seasons? Is it a
consequence of the inherent complexity of the detailed invertase model? In order to
address these questions, in this section we will study a simplified version of the model
presented in Chapter 2.
This toy model is based on the phenomenological approach towards spatial struc-
ture discussed in Chapter 2, and its dynamics can be described for a homogeneous
environment as follows:
dS
dt
= −Inv · S
k + S
·N1 − U(S) · (N1 +N2) (5.1)
dG
dt
= Inv · S
k + S
·N1 − U(G) · (N1 +N2) (5.2)
dN1
dt
= (1− Icost) · ES · U(S) ·N1 + EG · U(G) ·N1 (5.3)
dN2
dt
= ES · U(S) ·N2 + EG · U(G) ·N2 (5.4)
with initial conditions and parameter values as follows:
Parameter Name Value
Initial Sugar S S0 0.7
Initial inoculation of cells N0 1.4×10−6
Efficiency of G EG 0.048
Efficiency of S ES 0.030
Cost of production of the enzyme I Icost 0.1
Invertase production Inver 77.109
Diffusion parameter d 0.007
U(S) and U(G) denote the uptake rate of resources S and G respectively, Inv a
function representing invertase production, Icost the cost of producing invertase, while
ES and EG are the efficiencies at which S and G are converted into ATP respectively.
The dynamics between seasons is equivalent to that described in the previous sec-
82
Chapter 5. Seasonal dynamics and long-term coexistence
tion, i.e. the initial condition of a given season is determined based on a sample of the
terminal condition of the previous season.
For the purpose of this section, we will focus exclusively on the migratory regime,
the reason being that under this regime long-term equilibria can be predicted from
exploring only one season, thus simplifying considerably the experimental testing and
mathematical analysis.
The dynamics of this toy model for low mixing parameter (m = 0.2), with T = 50
and T = 150 is illustrated in Figure 5-7. Note that in Figure 5-7(a) the system
presents two different stable equilibria located in the extreme values 0 and 1, and
as a consequence no co-existence is found. In contrast, when the length of each season
is increased (T = 150), the system presents more than two different stable equilibria,
as shown in Figure 5-7(b). In particular for the region between 0.6 and 0.8 the system
presents an infinity of fixed points that could be an indicator of chaotic behaviour [91].
Figure 5-8(a) shows the bifurcation diagram for a low mixing parameter (m = 0.2).
Note that this case also presents what appears to be a chaotic dynamic via a period-
doubling bifurcation. Therefore we argue that the complex dynamics presented by this
model is not a consequence of the transfer protocol nor the metabolic detail, but of
the complex ecology that the two competitors are subjected to. However, this result
does not hold for every mixing condition, as changing the parameter m can produce a
different outcome: at high values of m the system presents a single stable equilibrium,
as illustrated in Figure 5-8(b).
In summary, if we combine the results presented for both the simple and the pa-
rameterised model, we notice that the system presents chaotic behaviour under dif-
ferent circumstances. For the parameterised model we find chaotic behaviour for the
non-migratory regime, which implies that the dynamics between seasons can indeed
introduce complex dynamics in the system. We stress that the chaotic regime was
found for low and medium values of the mixing parameter m, as can be seen in Ta-
ble 5.2. Moreover, the behaviour for the migratory regime in the simple model also
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(a) (m = 0.2 T = 50)
(b) (m = 0.2 T = 150)
Figure 5-7: Incomplete season dynamics. (a) Two stable equilibria are found in the
extremes and no-coexistence are found. (b) Several stable equilibrium are found, in
particular the region between 0.6 and 0.8 presents an infinity of fixed points.
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(a) Low degree of mixing (m = 0.2)
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(b) High degree of mixing (m = 0.8)
Figure 5-8: Bifurcation diagrams of the migratory regime for values m = 0.2 and
m = 0.8.
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presents chaotic dynamics, but in this case only for a low value of the mixing param-
eter. These observations suggest that spatially structured environments could be an
important factor for the system to present a complex dynamics.
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Low m
50 100 150 200 250
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Transfer time
Fi
na
l F
re
qu
en
cy
 o
f P
ro
du
ce
rs
Migratory Regime
50 100 150 200 250
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Transfer time
Fi
na
l F
re
qu
en
cy
 o
f P
ro
du
ce
rs
Non−Migratory Regime (m=0.2)
Medium m
50 100 150 200 250
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Transfer time
Fi
na
l F
re
qu
en
cy
 o
f P
ro
du
ce
rs
Migratory Regime
50 100 150 200 250
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Transfer time
Fi
na
l F
re
qu
en
cy
 o
f P
ro
du
ce
rs
Non−migratory Regime
High m
100 200 300 400
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Transfer time
Fi
na
l F
re
qu
en
cy
 o
f P
ro
du
ce
rs
Migratory Regime
50 100 150 200 250
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Transfer time
Fi
na
l F
re
qu
en
cy
 o
f P
ro
du
ce
rs
Non−Migratory Regime (m=0.8)
Table 5.2: Panel comparing different degrees of mixing for both the migratory (sim-
ple model) and non-migratory regime (parameterised model) showing that for low
values of m the system presents chaos.
5.4.1 Final remarks on temporal structure
Here we have investigated the maintenance of diversity in a seasonal structured envi-
ronment by employing a theoretical approach that utilises a well-known experimental
system: invertase production/non-production polymorphism in yeast. Subsequently
we asked a range of general ecological questions considering two different regimes for
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re-colonisation between seasons: a migratory regime and a non-migratory regime. In
the former, the spatial structure is the same at the start of each season, while in the
latter the spatial structure at the start of a season is determined by the spatial struc-
ture seen at the end of the prior season. We found that for complete seasons (when all
the food has been depleted), co-existence between the two different strains of yeast is
observed.
Under both regimes, we expect one equilibrium for each m, regardless of the initial
condition. This result we thus consider to be potentially of some generality applicable
beyond the confines of our particular yeast system. Indeed, this result suggests that
in considering the dynamics of co-operation, it would be profitable to consider not just
how social structure co-evolves with co-operation but also how co-operators and cheats
migrate between seasons.
Surprisingly we found that when not all the resources have been depleted the out-
come of the system is rather different. As it is uncommon that resource exhaustion
is assayed, it is worth asking whether this might be an important assumption. More-
over, this may also be relevant to cases where migration or over-wintering is initiated
on the expectation that resources will be depleted, rather than when they have been
exhausted. We showed that the length of the seasons is also important for the main-
tenance of co-existence. If we explore incomplete seasons, non-producers are able to
invade and outcompete producers. This may not be a general result. The producers
lose out because early in their growth phase is when they make most of the costly
invertase. Hence transferring early gives advantage to the non-producers. Temporal
dynamics of cost, while greatly relevant for our case need not be so relevant in other
circumstances.
Our results have implications for experimental design. In general these regimes
are used to obtain information about maintenance of diversity [42, 64, 99]. It is well
recognised that population structure is often important in this context. Whether pop-
ulation structure is something that itself is permitted to evolve is, as we have shown an
important issue to consider. Whether the temporal dynamics of resource use matters
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and, in turn, whether failure to exhaust resources matters is worth considering on a
case-by-case basis.
This chapter has discussed how a seasonal environment can induce a complex dy-
namics into the system. This unexpected result, however, has produced a series of
interesting questions that we expect to address in future research, both theoretical and
experimental.
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Discussion
Using a classic “cooperative” system based on the polymorphic secretion of invertase
in yeast [36, 61], we constructed a mathematical model to study a set of competition
experiments between individuals that produce invertase and individuals that do not
produce this enzyme. The assumptions of our model are based on the basic biochem-
istry of yeast and thus the corresponding fitness of different strains was not defined a
priori.
Interestingly, experimental results showed that when competing these strains in
a resource-limited and structured environment, a population composed of producers
and non-producers of invertase has a higher fitness ( than a population formed of just
producers. This result, although counterintuitive, is in agreement with the predictions
of our model. Furthermore, our modelling approach allowed us to obtain a mechanistic
understanding of the system, identifying the following conditions as necessary to explain
this result:
• Some organisms present a rate-efficiency trade-off [60, 69]. Cells use re-
sources most efficiently when the resources are rare. For this reason, a population
consisting only of producers of invertase creates abundant resources and therefore
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consumes them inefficiently, lowering the overall fitness of the population.
• Producing unnecessary invertase, which has a metabolic cost associ-
ated. It is important to notice that, as invertase production is regulated
exclusively by glucose, cells produce invertase even when there is no more sucrose
to be hydrolysed. Consequently cells waste the extra invertase produced whilst
still paying the cost of producing it.
The wasteful production of invertase, however, only has an impact when sucrose
is a limiting resource. The reason why yeast evolves this regulatory system (yeast
only has sensors for glucose) is unknown and may be an interesting follow-up of
this work. A possible explanation could be that the strain we are using evolved in
a laboratory environment, where glucose is the principal carbon source, other pos-
sible explanation could be that yeast has also evolved in seasonal environments,
and therefore producing extra invertase for the time when sucrose becomes avail-
able again could be an effective bet-hedging strategy. A possible follow up could
be engineer a strain capable of sensing sucrose and compete it with our strain
(just capable of sensing glucose).
• Spatially structured environments.[39, 74] The experimental setup is de-
signed in such a way that yeast grows in spatially structured environments (agar
plates). Our model includes spatial structure in a phenomenological way, when
the same system is tested in homogeneous environments (shaking flasks), both
theory and experiments, didn’t held the result that mixed populations are fitter
than populations exclusively formed of producers.
In our theoretical model we found that mixed population are fitter than populations
formed exclusively of producers. We found this result surprising as classical cooper-
ation theory assumes that co-operative behaviour always increases the fitness of the
population [70, 19].
We argue that this result could help us understand the coexistence of apparent
“cheats” and “cooperators” in a population, and why we observed their coexistence in
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nature. In our model system, social interaction between them will increase the benefit
for both as a group, instead of as individual strains.
6.0.2 Spatial structure matters
In order to study nature and to understand how organisms have evolved, it is important
to understand the consequences of spatially structured environments in their ecological
interactions. The competitive exclusion principle states that well-mixed environments
are beneficial to species with the higher fitness in that particular environment, not
allowing other phenotypes to survive [4]. In a heterogeneous environment , however,
it is possible to have different niches supporting organisms with a wide variety of sur-
vival strategies. For instance, cooperative strategies benefit from a spatially structured
environment.
In Chapter 3 we constructed a spatially explicit model based on the diffusion equa-
tion and the parameterisation previously used. With this approach we found the same
qualitative results as seen in our competition experiments, and in agreement with the
three-region model. In particular, we found that in this model system fitness also peaks
at an intermediate frequency, and as a consequence we showed the result is robust to
different models of spatial diffusion of resources.
Furthermore, the spatially explicit model is in agreement with previous studies
[21, 71, 100] stating that the best way of maintaining coexistence between two com-
petitors is a“patchy structure”. This structure allows producers to keep enough sugar
to compensate the cost of producing invertase, but sharing enough and therefore not
suffering the effect of the rate-efficiency trade-off by maintaining the levels of sugars
low enough to stay in the upper plateau of the function. The optimal scenario for the
group is such that part of the sugar has to be shared with non-producers and as a
consequence the population (as a group) increments its fitness. Of course there is a
fine equilibrium between how much resources producers have to share in order to avoid
the rate-efficiency trade-off and having enough to maintain their growth.
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Also, by changing the initial population distribution and as a consequence the
population structure, we obtained different results regarding the long-term coexistence
of producers and non-producers, it is important to notice that spatial structure is not
a sufficient conditions for finding coexistence in the long-term in this system.
Having found the phenomenological and the spatially explicit model give the same
qualitative predictions, for the remainder of the thesis we decided to use the previous
m model as it had the advantage of giving not only qualitative predictions but also
to predict quantitatively our experimental data. This was, after all, the principal
motivation of using a systems-biology approach instead of a general-model approach.
6.0.3 Temporal Structure also matters
During the first chapters of this thesis we considered a one-season scenario in order
to quantify the relative fitness of producers with respect to non-producers. The ex-
perimental system we considered is based on each replicate having the same initial
conditions (concentration of resources and total density of cells) and the same initial
spatial structure. If any of these initial conditions was not preserved, we would not be
able to make any objective comparisons between the experiments.
The maintenance of diversity in ecosystems is an important topic in evolutionary
biology [16]; temporal structure can be responsible for the complex interactions that we
observe in nature. A competition between two actors in one season does not necessarily
reflect the outcome of the competition between the same two actors under a seasonal
regime.
In experimental evolution serial transfer regimes are used as a proxy of seasonal
environments. This is a widely used technique in the study of evolution in microorgan-
isms and one that we have used to study the long-term coexistence between producers
and non-producers.
We found that there are at least two different ways of experimentally transferring
from one season to another, the difference between them is the way by which the
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spatial structure is kept between seasons. An analogy of both transfer protocols can be
described as migratory and non-migratory regimes in nature, both being well-studied
settings in ecology.
During an academic visit to Greig’s lab in the Max Planck Institute in Plo¨n, I
performed long-term competition experiments in order to evaluate the long-term con-
sequences of both regimes. Although the results obtained seem to be inconclusive, this
motivated a further theoretical study regarding the hybrid dynamics of both transfer
protocols. The result of this study, and a possible explanation of the inconclusiveness
of the experiments, is discussed in Chapter 5.
Why were the results of the first set of experiments inconclusive? This question can
have many answers, first of all, as we show (in theory) this system is highly complex
and details of the spatial structure and the timing between transfers can fundamentally
affect the resulting dynamics.
For example, if the experimental design allocates a single patch on the centre of
a 25 ml agar plate, under a migratory regime this small patch was transferred to a
fresh medium maintaining the same size, in contrast uto the non-migratory regime
where transfers are performed by replica plating. As a result the patch in the middle
is“squeezed” and therefore increases its diameter with each season. It is important to
highlight this issue because agar is a semi-solid material and the sugar has to diffuse
through it, so it is possible that agar plates that have bigger patches have also better
access to sugar in the medium. Although we let yeast grow for 6 days, the remaining
sugar at the end of the season was not measured. It could even be the case that in one
of the regimes cells were depleting the available sugar while in the other case there was
still sugar in the environment. This apparently minor difference may have dramatic
consequences.
In our theoretical study, we extended our model in order to introduce a serial
transfer regime, and we found that the long-term equilibrium is very sensitive to the
length of the season and the timing between transfers. Transferring before all the sugar
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has been depleted can lead to multiple steady states and in some cases drive the system
into a chaotic regime.
We believe this result could be relevant in the design of experimental protocols.
This result, however, is still preliminary, as a rigorous mathematical analysis has to
be performed in addition to testing it experimentally. Furthermore, it is important to
notice that this result is not contingent upon the model system studied in this thesis;
here we argue that this complex dynamics could be a consequence of the underlying
seasonal dynamics. In order to test this hypothesis, we constructed a simplified version
of the model that ignores the metabolic detail and still recovers the complex dynamics.
Indeed the simple model also found that chaotic behaviour is more robust than
expected and not a consequence of the transfer regime under consideration. This is
an important observation as it allows us to study the dynamics of the system using a
transfer protocol that preserves the population structure between seasons and therefore
allowing us to construct a map between different initial conditions.
Performing numerical simulations on the simple model we found that the chaotic be-
haviour could be found in both transfer regimes, but with different models; the system
specific and the toy model, the reason could be the dynamics of the phenomenological
spatial mode. To test is this is the case a follow up would be do the transfers with
different regimes in the explicit spatial model. We believe the fact that we can found
chaos in this system could be relevant to test this phenomenon experimentally, because
then it is possible to characterise the long-term dynamics of the system based only
on an analysis of the dynamics within one season. Choosing several initial conditions,
and using the transfer protocol that preserves population structure between seasons,
we can determine the long-term status of each sub-population using a one-dimensional
iterated map and a cobweb plot.
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6.0.4 How general are the results presented in this thesis?
After the publication of the main result presented in this thesis [61], we have received
comments expressing concerns about the generality of our predictions, and criticising
our approach for being too system-specific. I agree that using the modelling approach
used in this thesis, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to study co-operative
behaviour in more complex systems. Nevertheless, two of the three fundamental con-
ditions discussed in this thesis are general properties present in different co-operative
systems [29], being imperfect information the only “system-specific” condition.
Other approaches, for instance those that use game theory as a main theoretical
tool, would of course be more flexible as in general they ignore biochemical details of
the system. However, it is our contention that using a bottom-up approach gives us
a mechanistic understanding of the system that could help us find the biological basis
underlying the maintenance of cooperation, fundaments that could eventually be tested
in other co-operative systems. Is it too much to suggest that for theoretical models
to be useful they should say something new about a system, and not only be used to
validate the observer’s biological intuition?
Here we have shown that there are circumstances where non-producers of invertase
(also known as “cheats”) add to the fitness of a group when co-existing with producers
(referred to as “cooperators”). So, why is it that non-producers are referred to as
cheats? If it would be possible to find situations where this phenomenon occurs in
different co-operative systems, it may help us find general answers about the social
dilemma related to the co-existence of cheats and cooperators in natural environments,
especially in structured environments where components of “group” fitness may be most
critical. The language of cooperator and cheat is likely to limit our understanding of the
system [23], and therefore it may be time to revisit the co-operation problem without
using anthropomorphic terms when speaking about microbes.
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Appendix
A.1 Experimental Design
The experiments have been conducted using a yeast model system developed in Greig
and Travisano [36]. It consists of two isogenic yeast strains, SUC2 (a/a, leu2/leu2,
his5/his5, ura3/ura3, SUC2/SUC2) and suc2, an isogenic diploid strain in which both
copies of SUC2 have been replaced by KanMX. SUC2 secretes the enzyme invertase
required to catalyse hydrolysis of sucrose into glucose and fructose and is therefore
termed producer or co-operator, while the other strain suc2 does not secrete invertase
and is termed non-producer or cheat. For all experiments, yeast were grown in sup-
plemented minimal medium (5 g/L ammonium sulphate, 1.7 g/L yeast nitrogen base,
50 mg/L uracil, 20 mg/L histidine, 50 mg/L leucine) containing agar (16g/L), sucrose,
and glucose when necessary. All cultures were grown at a temperature of 30◦C and
liquid cultures were shaken using an orbital incubator (150 rpm). For further details
of strains see [36, 60].
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A.1.1 Experimental Design A
SUC2 and suc2 were competed against each other for 24 h in 16 chemostats supplied
with glucose-limited culture medium (0.8 g/L) incubated with continuous shaking and
aeration. Dilution rate varied between 0.2 and 0.4 per hour. Using these conditions,
glucose uptake rate is between 0.2 and 0.4 mmol/gram/hour [104], which induces the
secretion of invertase in SUC2 cells [18] so that invertase makes up approximately
0.1% of cell protein. Quantitative PCR and DNA extracted from samples taken from
each chemostat before and after competition was used to measure the change in the
abundance of suc2 and SUC2 during competition. Fitness was calculated as the ratio
of population doublings during competition (w).
A.1.2 Experimental Design B
Starter cultures of SUC2 and suc2 were grown up overnight in liquid YPD medium.
Starter cultures were then diluted down 10×− 4 and each strain was inoculated onto 2
µM filters (Milipore, UK) that were placed on agar plates containing 100 g/L sucrose
(10%) or 20 g/L sucrose (2%). Each strain was spread onto four filters on two agar
plates of each sucrose concentration. One randomly selected filter was removed from
each agar plate after 4 h, 24 h, 30 h, and 48 h. Filters were vortexed in sterile saline
for approximately 30 s to form a cell suspension that was diluted down and plated
out YPD plates to determine cell titre on each disk. Growth rate was calculated as
the slope of population doublings against time during the exponential phase of growth.
Results from the 10% and 2% sucrose plates were combined because growth rates were
equal on these two media for both strains.
A.1.3 Experimental Design C
We established competition cultures of a SUC2 strain and a suc2 strain that were
grown up overnight in YPD broth. 20 mL agar plates, containing 20 g/L (2%) sucrose,
were inoculated with 20 20 mL aliquots of competition cultures in a standardised 5 by
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4 array. We consider two population structures. In the mixed population treatment,
each aliquot on a plate consisted of the same mix of both SUC2 and suc2. In the
structured treatment each aliquot on a plate consisted of either SUC2 or suc2. In
total 12 competitions were carried out on mixed as well as structured plates. For
the mixed treatment, starter cultures were mixed to form competition cultures where
each aliquot consisted of a fixed proportion of SUC2, with the following cases being
considered 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% of SUC2. For the structured treatment, cases
considered were 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% of aliquots containing only SUC2 while the
rest of respective aliquots contained suc2. In this treatment, the position of suc2 and
SUC2 aliquots on the array was randomised.
After all sugar was exhausted (population growth had ceased) the content of each
agar plate was homogenised by washing cells off of the plate in 3 mL of sterile saline.
The fitness of SUC2 and suc2 was determined by quantitative PCR on DNA extracted
from samples taken before and after competition. To estimate net titre, cells were
serially diluted and spread on YPD plates to accurately determine cell numbers at the
end of the experiment.
A.1.4 Experimental Design D
The methods for this experiment were the same as for Experiment C with the follow-
ing exceptions. 20 mL agar plates, containing 2% sucrose, were inoculated with single
aliquot of competition culture containing 1.2×105 cells evenly spread across the entire
plate. We considered the cases where each aliquot contained SUC2 at an initial fre-
quency of 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100%. After 2 days of incubation, the content
of the agar plate was homogenised by washing off cells in 3 mL of sterile saline. To
determine titre, we plated serial dilutions of this homogenised sample on YPD agar
plates.
The titre data from Experiments C and D were subsequently normalised to maxi-
mum observed titre in each set-up before presenting in Figure 1.
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A.1.5 Experimental Design E
Starter cultures of SUC2 and suc2 were grown up for 2 days in liquid YPD medium, and
then samples were diluted down and plated to yield single colonies on YPD agar, which
were counted to determine the original cell density in the starter cultures. Mixtures
of these starter cultures were made corresponding to 100%, 80%, 60%, 40%, 20%, and
0% by volume of the SUC2 culture, and these were diluted 10-fold with sterile water.
13 µL of each of these diluted mixtures was pipetted onto the centre of 20 ml plates
containing 0.1% or 0.01% sucrose. These plates were incubated for 7 days, then the
patch of cells in the middle of each plate was cut out of the agar using a sterile scalpel
and placed into 5 ml of sterile water in a capped test-tube. These test-tubes were
vortexed vigorously to wash the yeast cells from the agar, and the resulting suspension
was diluted down and plated out on YPD medium to determine the number of cells in
each patch.
A.1.6 Experimental Design F
For the experiment in liquid culture, 1.3 µL of each of the diluted cell mixtures, as
described in Design E, was pipetted into 2 ml liquid 2% sucrose medium in 25 mm
wide test-tubes. These were incubated for 2 days with shaking, before the cultures
were diluted down and plated to determine the number of cells in each culture. The
experiments were replicated three times.
A.1.7 Quantitative PCR
DNA for use in quantitative PCR was extracted using a Wizard genomic DNA extrac-
tion kit (Promega, UK) as per the manufacturer’s instructions. DNA was amplified
using SYBR Green Master Mix (Applied Biosystems International) or TaqMan Uni-
versal PCR master mix (Applied Biosystems International), depending on whether or
not a dual-labeled probe was used in the amplification reaction. Amplification re-
actions contained each primer at a concentration of 900 nM and a dual labeled probe
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(where appropriate) at a concentration of 62.5 nM. SYBR Green chemistry was used to
detect the SUC2 strain using forward (5’- CGATGATTTGACTAATTGGGAAGA-3’)
and reverse primers (5’-CCAGAGAAAGCACCTGAATCGT-3’) that amplify a sec-
tion of the SUC2 gene. The suc2 strain was detected using a dual-labeled probe
(FAM-CGGGCAATCAGGTGCGACAATCTATC-TAM) that binds between forward
(5’-GTATAAATG- GGCTCGCGATAATG-3’) and reverse primers
(59-CATC- GGGCTTCCCATACAAT-39) of the KanMX gene. Amplifications were
carried out in an ABI 7000 sequence detection under the following reaction conditions:
10 min at 95◦C followed by 40 cycles or 95◦C for 30 s followed by 60◦C for 30 s. The
relative copy number of a particular sequence in a given amplification reaction was
determined by comparison with standard curves of DNA extracted from known refer-
ence strains. Each amplification reaction from a competition culture was carried out
with at least 2- to 4-fold replication. Fitness was measured as ratio of doublings of
the two strains during competition, such that a value of 1 represents equal competitive
ability. Quantitative-PCR based methods have previously been used to measure fitness
of yeast during competition, and preliminary experiments revealed that this protocol
gives equivalent results to measuring the abundance of SUC2 and suc2 by plating
samples of competition cultures on YPD and YPD supplemented with geneticin, which
selects for the suc2 strain.
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